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I.

INTRODUCTION

Thousands of rivers, streams and lakes in the West are dried up
completely by appropriators each year with disastrous consequences for fish and other living things which depend on water
for survival. Countless other water bodies, so depleted by diversions, either annually or occasionally, are totally changed
from their natural state and become an entirely different ecological habitat.'
Instream values2 in the state of California are facing a crisis.
Industrial, municipal, and agricultural growth have significantly
depleted instream flows with devastating consequences for instream values.3 As the State Water Resources Control Board
(the SWRCB or Board)4 continues to issue more rights to divert
J.D., Stanford Law School, 1990; B.A., University of California, Davis, 1987.
J.D. Candidate, University of Colorado Law School, 1992; B.A., University of
California, Davis 1988.
The authors are greatly ipdebted to Prof. Barton H. Thompson for his incisive criticism and unending patience.
1. Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAvIs L.
REV. 233 n.2 (1980).
2. Instream values are the benefits derived from using water in its natural watercourse rather than diverting it for other uses. Instream values include, but are not limited to, stream-dependent fish and wildlife populations, riparian habitat, recreational
uses such as fishing and boating, aesthetic benefits, water quality benefits, and use for
*

**

scientific studies.

GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGOiTS LAW,

FINAL REPORT 99 (1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The terms "instream values" and
"instream uses" are used interchangeably.
3. See generally M. REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 54-107, 354-92 (1986); W. KARIL,
CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS (1979); R. WOORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY AND
THE GROWTH OF T1HE AMERICAN WEST 96-111, 213-17, 233-37 (1985).

4. The SWRCB is responsible for issuing appropriative rights, and has administered water rights in California since 1967. Robie, Some Reflections on Environment Considerations in Water Rights Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 697 n.9 (1972).
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water, the crisis is becoming more widespread and critical.
The effect of diversions on salmon and steelhead populations
in California demonstrates the severity of the situation:
The [Bureau's] Central] V[alley] P[roject] has blocked major
migration routes for anadromous fish primarily through the
construction of dams and water diversion facilities. As a result
wild stocks of chinook salmon and steelhead trout have been
virtually eliminated, instream flows have been severely reduced
in remaining habitat, and gravel recruitment necessary for
spawning has been halted.5
The dramatic decline of these important sport and commercial
fisheries is largely the result of diversion facilities which reduce
downstream flows and often block access to spawning areas.'
Other uses of water such as recreation, angling, and wetlands
preservation that rely on instream flows have suffered similar
setbacks.7

In order to protect instream values by preventing further
harmful depletions of water and reversing the damage caused by
previous losses, the authors assert that California water law must
achieve two objectives: (1) ensure the representation and protection of instream values when the Board rules on new applications
to appropriate water; and (2) promote the reallocation of currently diverted water to the protection of instream values by en5. Letter from Daniel W. McGovern, EPA Region IX Administrator, to Lawrence F.
Hancock, Bureau Mid-Pacific Acting Regional Director 3 (May 8, 1989) (copy on file
with the Stanford Environmental Law Society) [hereinafter McGovern Letter and Attachment to McGovern Letter]. The letter further stated: "To date, [the Bureau's] efforts to offset CVP-related environmental damage have not been sufficient to fully
mitigate adverse impacts on established beneficial uses such as anadromous fisheries,
internationally significant Pacific Flyway waterfowl habitat, nationally recognized significant estuarine resources, and riparian systems."
6. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 100 (citing C. HAZEL, AssEssm r OF EFFECTS OF
ALTERED STREAM FLOW CHARACTERISTICS ON

FISH

AND WILDLIFE, PART B: CALIFORNIA

(report for the U.S. Department of the Interior (1976)). A citizen's advisory committee
found the health of California's salmon and steelhead populations to be seriously
threatened as a result of these diversion facilities: "North Coast counting stations over
the past three decades have shown declines of 66 percent in steelhead, 65 percent in
silver salmon and 64 percent in king salmon. The Central Valley king salmon adult
spawning population has dropped from 597,000 fish in 1953 to 332,000 fish in 1969 - a
46 percent decline." FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 99 (quoting Cmz'.'s ADVISORY
COMMITT'EE, AN ENVIRONMENTAL
STEELHEAD TROUT

7.

TRAGEDY -

REPORT ON CALIFORNIA SALMON

AND

16 (1971)).

NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR TIlE FUTURE,

19-37 (1973).

For a discussion of the economic impacts of reduced instream flows, see also infra notes
316-29 and accompanying text.
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couraging current water users to conserve water and make it
available for reallocation to instream flows.
Objective #1. Current law requires the consideration of instream values when the SWRCB rules on applications to appropriate water.8 Such consideration, however, fails to provide
consistent protection to the instream flow levels needed to maintain instream values. 9 Many academics' ° and the Governor's
Commission,'1 have recommended that the state adopt a mechanism to limit future diversions by making some water unavailable
for new appropriations or reserving some part of the unallocated
water in California's streams. Because there is currently no politically feasible mechanism for achieving such reservations, the
"next step" in protecting California's instream values is unlikely
to be the adoption of a mechanism for setting a limit on the
quantity of unallocated water which can be diverted from the
stream.
Objective # 2. In a limited number of cases, the Board and
courts may modify the exercise of existing water rights. Presumably, this authority could be exercised to enhance instream values. Some proponents of increased instream flows advocate the
expansion of administrative and judicial authority to effect such
reallocations of water. A centerpiece of their advocacy is the assertion that a series of "public trust" rights supersede and should
limit the exercise of diversions of water which harm instream values. This article explores the political and legal limitations on
exercises of administrative and judicial authority. The authors
argue that administrative and judicial authority fail to provide a
comprehensive solution to California's instream flow crisis.
This article thus proposes that the next step in protecting California's instream values should be a system of "market-based reallocation," which would utilize the state's increasing use of
"water marketing" to effect reallocation of water from diversionary to instream uses. The authors assume that proposed marketbased solutions will not conflict with administrative and judicial
8. For a discussion of the water right application process in California, see infra
notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
9. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 105-08.
10. See generally Gray, A Reconsiderationof Instream Appropriation-WaterRights in California, in INSTREAm FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST 181 (1989); Lilly, ProtectingStreamfilows in
California, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 697 (1980).
11. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 112-16. For a discussion of the Governor's
Commission's proposals, see infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
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authority to reallocate water and that the two policies can be used
concurrently within the state and on the same streams.
In order to achieve such market-based reallocation, instream

flow advocates must be able to acquire by gift, exchange, or
purchase any water, water right, or water entitlement for the ex-

press purpose of preserving or enhancing fish, wildlife, or recreational values. Examples of such market-based reallocation' 2 are:
(1) where a stream is controlled by a dam, instream flov groups
might purchase entitlements to some of the water stored behind
the dam and control its release;13 or (2) on unimpounded
12. The term market-based reallocation is composed of two distinct concepts:
market-based and reallocation. Market-based refers to the innovative use of financial
incentives to reallocate water rights. Financial incentives can take the form of: the direct
purchase of a water right, the funding of conservation measures in exchange for conserved water, the purchase of land and its accompanying rights, or the purchase of contractual entitlements for water from irrigation districts or the Bureau of Redamation.
Reallocation of a water right is the transfer by a current holder of a water right being put
to a beneficial use to a future holder of that right for a distinct and different beneficial
use; in this situation, the protection of instream values.
The authors draw a clear distinction between water marketing and market-based
reallocation. In California, however, the difference tends to be more theoretical than
practical. Water marketing in its most pure sense refers to the buying and selling of
water rights in a free market system such as an auction market for common stock. Water
marketing in its more practical sense refers to the use of financial incentives in water
resource management. Although this practical definition is similar to the authors' definition of market-based reallocation, it is necessary to maintain the distinction that the
authors are proposing a limited scheme of market-based reallocation for the protection
of instream values and are neither proposing a scheme for broad water marketing, nor
taking a stand as to its desirability. Therefore, the term market-based reallocation will
be used to refer to the proposal to allow instream groups to purchase water rights from
current appropriators for the augmentation of instream flows and the protection of instream values.
A distinction should also be made at the outset between market-based reallocation,
which the authors advocate, and instream appropriation, which the authors believe is
politically infeasible. Instream appropriation allows individuals and/or state agencies to
file for and obtain water rights to part or all of the unallocated water in a stream. By
contrast, Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah allow state agencies or private groups to
purchase currently diverted water and dedicate it to increasing instream flows. In most
cases, these water rights must be held by a specific state agency. Shupe, Ketping the lW'aters Flowing: Stream Flow Protection Programs, Strategies and Issues In the JEst, in INSTREA
FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST 1, 8 (1989). See also A. SCHNEIDER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INSTREAM WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA 101 (Governor's Commission to Review California
Water Rights Law, Staff Paper No. 6, 1978).
13. This article does not address directly situations where instream flow groups
compensate reservoir operators to alter water release schedules. These agreements are
frequently referred to as "physical solutions." Presumably, there is nothing in California law which prevents such practices. For an example of such an agreement, see FINAL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 111, 117. However, once released, the water may be available
for subsequent appropriation immediately below the dam. By possessing a water right,
instream flow groups can better protect the water from subsequent appropriation or any
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streams, instream flow groups might compensate a water user for

reducing or stopping her diversion and acquire a water right or
entitlement for the difference between the diverter's former and
new level of diversion.
Part II of the article provides an overview of California water
law and discusses the limits of present mechanisms and recent
proposals for protecting instream values. Part III discusses the
current direction of California water management, which is setting the stage for market-based reallocation. It then proposes
specific statutory changes which make market-based reallocation
possible as the next step in protecting California's instream values. The final section analyzes the integration of market-based
reallocation with existing California water law and institutions.
II.

CALIFORNIA WATER LAW AND EXISTING MECHANISMS TO
PROTECT INSTREAM VALUES

A.

The Development of California Water Law

The prior appropriation doctrine serves as the basis for surface water allocation in California. 14 The tenets of appropriation
originated in the customs of California's miners who needed
large amounts of water for hydraulic mining, but were often located far away from water sources.' 5 Mining custom established
that the first miner to divert a set quantity of water and put it to
use had a priority right to that water. Subsequent miners could
also establish rights to specific quantities of water from the same
watercourse, but only insofar as their diversions did not interfere

with the exercise of previously acquired or senior rights.' 6
The doctrine of prior appropriation seeks to provide as much
certainty as possible to each water right holder.' 7 An appropriative right establishes the right holder's relative priority to divert
changes in the agreement. For an excellent discussion of the state's authority to impose
physical solutions, see Dunning, The "Physical Solution" in Western Water Law, 57 U. COLO.
L. REV. 445 (1986).

14. "At least half of the state's net annual water demand of 31 million acre-feet is
met by the use of water initially secured through an appropriation of surface water
within California."

15. W.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 2. at 11.

HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS

42 (1956).

16. Id. at 47.

17. As the United States Supreme Court noted, prior appropriation is "largely a
product of the compelling need for certainty in the holding and use of water rights."
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1982).
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water,'8 and specifies the quantity of water available for the appropriator's use.' 9 Appropriative rights were made even more
secure through the creation of the forfeiture doctrine which declares an appropriative right forfeited if it is unexercised.2 0 The
forfeiture doctrine 2 ' aids certainty by preventing the unexpected
exercise of dormant appropriative rights.
Although early California miners were trespassers on federal
land, Congress recognized their right to continue using the water
they had diverted.22 Upholding the legality of the miners' actions
was a response to public opinion 23 and the prevailing 19th century view that resources only have value when they are controlled
by man. 24 This philosophy underlies the doctrine of prior appropriation. Under the auspices of prior appropriation, the state encouraged substantial diversions of water without regard for
instream values. As one commentator points out, "[t]he concept
that instream flows are a resource use on a level comparable to
other water uses is in marked contrast to the legal institutions
which were created to govern water use2 5during the development
period in the arid and semiarid West."
18. Appropriators do not obtain rights to water itself. As the California Supreme
Court has pointed out, "[iut is laid down by our law writers, that the right of property in
water is usufiuctuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its
use." Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) (emphasis in original).

19.

W. HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 40.

20. Id. at 293; J. SAx AND R. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 399405 (1986).
21. Attwater and Markle, Overview of California Water Rights and IWater Quality Law, 19
PAC. LJ.957, 967 (1988).
22. As Hutchins chronicles:
Congress by the Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877 provided, respectively, that the
owners and possessors of vested and accrued appropriative rights on the public
domain recognized by local customs, laws, and court decisions should be protected in the same, and rights of way therefor [sic] were acknowledged and
confirmed (Act of 1866); that all patents, pre-emptions. and homesteads should
be subject to water and ditch rights so recognized by the Act of 1866 (amendment of 1870); and that water rights on desert lands should depend upon prior
appropriation... (Desert Land Act of 1877).

W.

HUTCHINS,

supra note 15, at 72.

23. During the mid-1800s, Nevada County was the most populated area in California and its dominant industry was mining. See Attwater and Markie, supra note 21, at
964.
24. See Tarlock, Recent Development in the Recognition of Iutrram Uses in Western 1ater
Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871 nn. 2-3 and accompanying text.
25. Anderson, Conflict Between Establishment of Instream Flows and Other J1'aterUses on
Western Streams, 18 WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN 61, 62 (Feb. 1982) (publication of
American Water Resources Association). Indeed, in 1884, the California Supreme
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In 1872, the California Legislature extended explicit recognition to prior appropriation.26 Despite this official recognition of
appropriative rights, their priority in relation to riparian water

rights2 7 was still unclear. A riparian right holder can not claim a

fixed quantity of water nor priority over other riparians.28 In order to protect the needs of other riparians, each riparian must
limit her water use to a "reasonable" quantity. 2 9 Yet until 1928,

riparians were not required to limit their water use, even to a
"reasonable amount" to protect most appropriative rights.
However, case law limited all appropriative rights to the "reason31
able" amount of water needed for a "beneficial use."
As long as riparians were not required to use water efficiently,
they could prevent water development and diversion projects.32
For example, in 1926, Southern California Edison was unable to
build a hydroelectric power plant because a court upheld a riparian landowner's right to the uninterrupted use of spring flood
water for overflow irrigation. 33 In 1928, the California Constitution was amended to prevent similar impediments to water development. Article 10, section 2 of California's Constitution3 4 now
requires that all uses of water be limited to the "reasonable"
'35
amount of water needed for a "beneficial use."
Court upheld the validity of an appropriative right which consumed the entire flow of a
stream. Brown v. Mullin, 65 Cal. 89, 3 P. 99 (1884).
26. Tacit recognition had already been inferred by the courts based on an 1851
statute which extended a general sanction to mining practices. Attwater and Markle,
supra note 21, at 962.
27. Riparianism is the basic water law for humid regions such as England and the
Eastern portion of the United States. Riparianism differs from appropriation in many
important respects: riparian rights are based solely on land ownership, they are held
only by those whose land abuts a watercourse, and they exist whether or not they are
exercised. SeeJ. SAX AND R. ABRAMS, supra note 20, at 154-57.
28. Id. at 157.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 P.
607 (1926). Appropriators only enjoy superior rights to riparians if they perfected their
appropriative rights before a competing riparian's land passed from government ownership. W. HUrCHINS, supra note 15, at 60-61.
31. Attwater and Markle, supra note 21, at 978. W. HuTrcHINS, supra note 15, at
135-36.
32. Indeed, the ever-present possibility that dormant riparian right holders might
assert their rights counteracted the certainty which the prior appropriation doctrine
sought to provide.
33. Herminghaus, 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607.
34. The amendment was originally codified as CAL. CONST., ART. XIV, § 3.
35. Case law establishes that these terms refer to separate aspects of a water use.
Most uses can be shown to be of some use to some person and are thus "beneficial
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Riparian demands for water occasionally had the unintended

result of preventing water impoundment and diversion projects,
thereby maintaining instream flow levels.3 6 In fact, from the
1848 gold rush through the first half of this century, there was no
significant attempt to integrate the protection of instream values
into California water allocation. 7 Allowing substantial diversions

of water notwithstanding their effect on instream values occurs
simply because "California water law is designed to allocate
rather than to ensure the integrity of natural
rights of diversion
3 8
streamflows."

B.

The Consideration of Instream Values in the Water Rights
Application Process

In response to the dramatic decline in the size and health of
fish populations, the California government has taken a variety of
steps to protect instream values. This section reviews the current

and proposed mechanisms for protecting instream flow levels by
limiting new water rights.
1.

Current mechanismsfor protecting instream values from new
diversions.

SWRCB power to limit appropriationof instreamflows. All surface
water rights obtained since 1914, except for riparian rights, are

conditioned on issuance of a permit or license by the Board.39
uses." Joslin v. Main Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 142-43, 429 P.2d 884, 896-97,
60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 384-85 (1967). However, the issues considered when determining the
"reasonableness" of a water use have grown. Expansion of the factors which can be
considered when ruling on the reasonableness of a water use provides increased opportunities to regulate water rights. See Kramer and Turner, Preventionof Waste or Unrrasonabe Use of Water: The CaliforniaExpeience, I AGRic. LJ. 519 (1982).
36. Dunning, Instream Flows and the Public Trust, in INs'REAt FLOW PRoTEcTIo. IN
THE WEST 103, 116 (1989) [hereinafter Instream Flows and the Public Trust].
37. For a discussion of California's failure to take instrean values into consideration in allocating water, see Robie, Modernizing State IVater Rights Laws: Some Suggestionsfor
New Directions, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 760, 771.
38. Lilly, supra note 10, at 699.
39. Gray, supra note 10, at 182. See People of the State of California v. Shirokow,
26 Cal. 3d 301, 605 P.2d 859, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1980). When an individual wishes to
establish an appropriative right, she submits an application to the Board which specifies
the amount of water she wishes to appropriate, the point of diversion, the place of use,
and the purpose of use. CAL. WATER CODE § 1260 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990).
There are three basic procedural steps in the acquisition of a right to the use of
water by appropriation. They may be described as application, permit, and license. The first step is the filing [of an application] with the [Board) ... to
By filing the application the applicant
appropriate unappropriated water ....
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The Board has the power to limit the number of diversions. In
ruling on an application to appropriate water, the Board makes
two determinations, both of which include an ostensible assessment of instream flow needs. The Board initially determines
whether, based on all existing uses, there is water "available for
appropriation. ' 40 If the Board is satisfied that water is available,
it then determines whether the proposed use is in the "public
interest." The Board's determination of public interest is based
in part on California Department of Fish and Game minimum
flow recommendations. 4 Additionally, the Board must consider
the instream flows needed to support the "uses specified to be
protected in any relevant [federal or state] water quality control
plan.' '42
This process provides insufficient protection of instream values because many instream uses of water which do not fall into
secures a right of procedural priority .... The second step comprises issuance

of the permit which carries forward the right of procedural priority and adds
the consent of the state to begin construction and to initiate the use of water,
limited by the terms of the permit .... The third step consists of issuance of
the license. Issuance of the license does not create the right but is merely confirmatory of a right acquired by use in accordance with the permit.
Ferrier, Administration of Water Rights in California,44 Calif. L. Rev. 833, 839 (1956). (The
term "water right" is generally used to refer to a Board-granted permit or license.)
40. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1243, 1243.5 (West Supp. 1990). As Schneider points
out, this assessment "is a different inquiry from determining whether there is 'unappropriated water'." A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 32.
41. CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West Supp. 1990). The Board relies heavily on
Fish and Game's recommendations to assess the instream flow needs of a stream. A.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 40-4 1. In 1982, the Legislature authorized the Department
of Fish and Game to "identify and list those streams and watercourses throughout the
state for which minimum flow levels need to be established in order to assure the continued viability of stream-related fish and wildlife resources." CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 10001 (West 1984). The objectives set by Fish and Game do not constrain, but only
serve to advise the Board. CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1971). The Legislature
granted Fish and Game the authority to establish instream flow objectives, "[i]n response to the deluge of applications to construct small hydroelectric power dams [after]
the enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 26012708." Gray, supra note 10, at 218 n.13. According to Gray, the Legislature hoped
these objectives would allow the state to control flow levels on streams where the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authorizes hydroelectric facilities. Id.
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected California's argument
that the state could impose instream flow conditions on FERC projects. California ex rel.
Water Resources Control Bd. v. FERC, 877 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1989). The Supreme
Court recently granted certiorarito review this decision. 110 S.Ct 537 (1989). For analysis of the impact of such facilities on instream values, see M. L. SHELTON & R.J. LACEY,
EVALUATION

OF THE IMPACT OF SMALL HYDROELECTRIC FACILITIES ON THE VISUAL RE-

SOURCES OF FREE-FLOWING STREAMS IN THE SIERRA NEVADA

42.

CAL. WATER CODE §

(1989).

1243.5 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990).
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the fish and wildlife context are not ensured adequate representation." The application process also fails to provide a "categorical directive to protect instream uses."" Indeed, the Legislature
has established two diversionary uses, municipal consumption
and irrigation, as the "highest" and next "highest" uses of
water.45 These uses make up over ninety percent of California's
46
present water use.
The California Water Code requires the Board to consider instream values when it determines whether water is available for
appropriation, but it provides no mandate to affirmatively protect
such values. 4 7 For this reason the water rights application process is inherently biased against instream flows. When the Board
determines the quantity of water available for appropriation, it
does not consider whether diverters are making the best use of
their water,48 but rather assumes categorically that currently diverted water is unavailable for appropriation. There is no mandate to set aside an amount of water to satisfy instream flow
needs, so when the SWRCB decides whether to approve a proposed diversion, "the focus of the Board's analysis is a weighing
of the reasonableness of the proposed appropriation against the
reasonableness of maintaining a certain level of instream flow
protection. 49
43. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 108.
44. Gray, supra note 10, at 190.

45. CAL. WATER CODE § 1254 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990).
46. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN 160-87, CALIFORNIA WATER: LOOxING TO THE FUTURE, STATISTICAL APPENDIX 30 Uanuary 1988) [hereinafter DWR BuLLETIN 160-87, STATISrICAL APPENDIX].

47. The Governor's Commission noted that "[e]xisting provisions may compel
consideration of instream values in the decision-making process ... but they do not
compel the substantive protection itself." FINAL REPORT, supra note 2. at 112. See also
Comment, New Protectionfor Califomia histrean 1'ater Uses, 3 STAN. ENTL. L ANN. 58, 61

(1980-1981).
48. Gray, supra note 10, at 196.
49. Id. Each time a new appropriative use is proposed, the Board must decide
anew a panoply of questions related to instream uses:
-Should the stream flows reserved to protect fish, wildlife, and recreational

uses under section 1243 of the [California] Water Code be reduced in order to
facilitate the new appropriation?
-In view of the new consumptive use, what constitutes reasonable protection of instream beneficial uses according to section 1243.5 of the [California]
Water Code?
-Considering the current needs of the state, what balance should be struck
between consumptive and public trust uses of the available %ater?
-What is the "relative benefit to be derived from ... all beneficial uses of
the water concerned?"
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Because the Board's evaluation process is structured this way,
when a prospective appropriator applies for a "piece of the pie,"
the only slice the SWRCB considers the availability of is the one
used for instream uses,50 and thus the "continual reevaluation of
the reasonableness of instream uses in light of new competing
uses is inherently prejudicial to the protection of instream
flows."' 5 ' Even in the rare cases where the SWRCB rejects an
application in order to maintain instream flow levels, the unappropriated water remains subject to future diversion.5 2
As long as water remains subject to appropriation, there is no
assurance that it will remain instream. Nothing in the appropriation process itself prevents a Board that values diversionary uses
over instream uses from granting rights to water that is critically
needed to maintain instream values. However, a Board that
seeks to protect instream values can do so only temporarily.
SWRCB power to reserve necessary instreamflows from subsequent diversion. Apart from the requirement that the Board consider instream needs in ruling on new appropriations, the Board has a
limited authority to issue protective terms and conditions, and a
limited duty to afford protection under California's Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act.
Terms and conditions. The SWRCB can provide some limited
protection for instream flows through its authority to impose
terms and conditions on water rights.5 3 For example, the
SWRCB may prohibit a water right holder from diverting water
when instream flow levels fall below a critical point. The
Id. at 197 (quoting CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1971)).
50. Instream flow advocates also bear the burden of proof in opposing a proposed
diversion. Lilly, supra note 10, at 709 n.88.
51. Gray, supra note 10, at 197. See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 107.
52. As the Governor's Commission noted: "[o]ne set of Board members may be
staunch in their defense of instream values, but if their successors in office hand out
permits freely.., the damage is done. And the damage is cumulative over time." FiNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 107 (quoting Introductory Remarks by Barry Goode, at
Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law workshop, at 17 (Feb.
16, 1978)). See also Graff, Environmental Quality, Water Marketing, and the Public Trust: Can
They Coexist?, 5 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137, 141 (1986).
53. Section 1253 of the California Water Code allows the Board to approve applications to appropriate water "under such terms and conditions as in its judgment will
best develop, conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water sought to be appropriated." CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990). The authority to impose terms and conditions on a permit may be even more important than the power to
reject an application because case law calls into question the SWRCB's ability to reject
an application where any objections raised by the Board can be met by "suitable terms
and conditions." A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 38 & nn. 166-69.
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SWRCB may also require water right holders to construct offstream water storage facilities in order to reduce the need for
stream diversions during particularly dry years.5r In ruling on
proposals to impound and divert large quantities of water, the
Board may impose "flow bypass" terms which require dam operators to release water in order to protect or enhance instream
values.-' For example, in the case of the New Melones Dam, the
SWRCB required the dam's operator (the Bureau of Reclamation) to release 98,000 acre feet per year (af/yr)5 6 to protect instream values below the dam.57
However, such terms and conditions do not adequately protect instream values for several reasons. First, the imposition of
terms and conditions occurs on a reactive case-by-case basis. Design of a diversion project is usually at an advanced stage, if not
complete, before an applicant brings a proposed application for
diversion before the Board.58 Terms and conditions to protect
instream values are thus "determined by weighing the utility of
the specific project against the value of the instream use instead
of basing such reservation on general public policy." 59 Second,
most of the large federal, state, and local projects already have
permits that do not include "flow bypass" conditions. Retroactive application of terms and conditions is limited to a few narrowly defined cases. 60 Finally, the terms and conditions imposed
apply only to individual diversions and fall short of a permanent
reservation.
[B]y-passed water in most cases is subject to appropriation
downstream and becomes a target over and over again for
54. See, eg., People i reL State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni. 54 Cal. App.
3d 743, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1976).
55. For a discussion of this and other examples of terms and conditions. see Gray,
supra note 10, at 184.
56. An acre foot of water is the water needed to cover an acre of land to the depth
of one foot. On average, an acre foot of water will meet the needs of two residences for
one year.
57. STATE WATER REsOURCES CONTROL BOARD, NEW MIELONES PROJECT WATER
RIGHTS DECISION-1422 at 21 (1973) (copy on file with the Stanford Environmental Law
Society) [hereinafter D-1422]. D-1422 contains the the terms and conditions which the
Board imposed on the Bureau's New Melones Dam. In 1982, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld California's authority to impose terms on federal projects, as long as
these terms do not contradict explicit congressional mandates. United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1982).
58. Robie, supra note 37, at 770.
59. Id.
60. FINAu REPORT, supra note 2, at 103.
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other would-be appropriators. This necessitates... [that Fish
and Game] continually protest each subsequent application and
make its case anew .... Fish and Game could be successful nine
times out of ten and, on the tenth water application, lose.
Thus, nine out of ten wins could
result in the total destruction
61
of a stream's fishery resource.
Wild and scenic river status. In 1972, the California Legislature
acted to protect streams which possessed unique scenic or ecological attributes through the California Wild and Scenic Rivers

Act.62 However, even where the Legislature grants a stream wild
and scenic river status, there is no assurance of a continued level

of adequate instream flow. In a recent ruling on a diversion from
the Lower American River (LAR),6 3 the SWRCB stated that:
61. A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 44-45 (quoting E.C. Fullerton, then-Director of
the California Department of Fish and Game.)
In 1987, the California Legislature enacted a statute which empowers the Board to
declare that a stream system is "fully appropriated." Before issuing the declaration, the
Board must find "that the supply of water in the stream system is being fully applied to
beneficial uses." CAL. WATER CODE § 1205(b) (West Supp. 1990) Although the language of the statute is unclear, it is arguable that the application of water to instream
uses may account for some or all of the water presently applied to beneficial uses. Once
the Board has declared that a stream system is fully appropriated, it (and successor
Boards) may only accept applications under conditions specified in the original declaration. CAL. WATER CODE § 1206 (West Supp. 1990).
There are, however, limits to this statute's usefulness for providing permanent protection to instream flows. Its application cannot be initiated by a citizen petition. Proceedings can only be invoked by the SWRCB after "previous water rights decisions have
determined that no water remains available for appropriation." CAL. WATER CODE
§ 1205(b) (West Supp. 1990). This requirement may limit the application of this statute
to streams that are completely diverted. Also, the Board is empowered to revoke or
amend the declaration upon its own motion or "upon petition of any interested person." CAL. WATER CODE § 1205(c) (West Supp. 1990). Thus, its provisions do not provide the immutable long-term protection which they initially appear to provide.
62. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5093.50-.69. The Act declares:
It is the policy of the State of California that certain rivers which possess extraordinary scenic, recreational, fishery, or wildlife values shall be preserved in
their free-flowing state .... for the benefit and enjoyment of the people of the
state. The Legislature declares that such we of these rivers is the highest and most beneficial use and is a reasonable and beneficial use of water within the meaning of
Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitution. It is the purpose of this
chapter to create a California Wild and Scenic Rivers System to be administered in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5093.50 (West 1984) (emphasis added).
63. In response to a suit challenging a diversion from the LAR, the Superior Court
of Alameda County appointed the Board referee to address legal, technical, and policy
questions raised by the East Bay Municipal Utilities District's proposed diversion. As a
result of the proceedings, the SWRCB produced three reports: a Report of Referee:
Lower American River Court Reference (June 1988) [hereinafter Reference Report]; a
Legal Report: American River Court Reference (June 1988) [hereinafter Legal Report];
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"[r]ead closely, the [California Wild and Scenic Rivers] Act appears to promise more protection than is actually delivered."'i
The Board was ruling on an attempt to prevent the East Bay Municipal Utilities District (EBMUD) from depleting flows in the
state-designated wild and scenic LAR. Instream flow advocates
argued in vain that the LAR's status as a state wild and scenic
river should constrain EBMUD from removing water upstream
from the designated part of the river. 66 In a narrow interpretation of California's Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the Board found
the Act does not prevent the construction of diversion or impoundment facilities upstream of designated streams or
tributaries. 67
The Board also stated that the Act gives inadequate guidance
for Board decision-making, 68 fails to designate specific flow levels
for wild and scenic rivers,6 9 and provides no blanket prohibition
of diversion from such rivers. 70 Thus, even in instances where
the Legislature establishes instream values as the highest use, a
Board may allow the reduction of instream flows.
2.

Governor's Commission proposalsfor protecting instream values
from new diversions.

Minimum streamflows. In 1978, the Governor's Commission
recommended that California establish a minimum streamflow
program.71 Unlike the current regime where all unallocated
water is available for diversion, a minimum flow program specifies a quantity of water to remain instream.7 - The Commission
and a Technical Report: American River Court Reference Uune 1988) [hereinafter
Technical Report].
64. Legal Report, supra note 63, at 153.
65. Id. at 149.
66. Id. at 150.
67. Id. at 153-54.
68. Id. at 154.
69. Id.
70. As one commentator points out, "[state wild and scenic river] statutes are directed toward dams or other structures on the streams and do not always insure minimum flows since diversions may still be made by gravity diversion or pumping." Robie,
supra note 37, at 770.
71. The Commission described such a program as having "the effect of prohibiting
the Board from granting a permit to appropriate water, from approving an application
for a change in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use, from assigning state
filings, or from approving water quality control plans which impair the standard." FiNAL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 114. Presumably, this water would also be protected from the
exercise of dormant riparian rights.
72. The Commission stopped short of recommending immutable instream flow
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believed the establishment of minimum streamflows would allow
the Board to "weigh the importance of the present or potential
instream values of the stream against the present or potential
value, economic or otherwise, of the stream for non-instream
uses." 3 Furthermore, the Commission was highly critical of the
present, ad hoc method of considering instream values in the
water rights application process. 4 It envisioned the minimum
streamflow program as an opportunity for comprehensive planning and management of a stream's resources, within the context
of providing long-term protection of instream values.
Instream appropriations. The Commission also addressed a pro-

posal for allowing the Board to issue appropriative rights for instream flows. 7 5 Provisions for instream appropriation would

allow an individual or group to apply to the Board for an appropriative permit for a set quantity of water to remain instream for
the specific purpose of protecting instream values. The Commission preferred a minimum streamflow program over instream appropriation as a long-term mechanism for maintaining instream
flows. 7 6 However, it did recommend that temporary instream ap-

propriations be granted in order to prevent irreparable damage
in the period before instream flow standards were established.77
The Commission recognized, however, that the courts would
have to make a final determination regarding instream appropriation if minimum instream flow legislation was not enacted.78
In the ten years since the Commission issued its report, both
administrative and legislative attempts at instituting a minimum
streamflow program have been unsuccessful. 79 In addition, two
state courts of appeals have rejected instream appropriations80
standards. The Commission recommended that the state's minimum streamflow program include a procedure allowing the Board to modify instream flow standards. Id. at
124.

73. Id. at 113.
74. Id. at 111.
75. At the time the Commission's report was being prepared, the question of
whether the Board was required to consider applications for instream appropriation was
being litigated. Two trial courts had split on the issue and both decisions were appealed. The results of these appeals are discussed infra note 80 and accompanying text.
76. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 118-19.
77. Id. at 119.
78. Id.
79. See generally Gray, supra note 10, at 190-99.
80. California Trout Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d
816, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1979) and Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90
Cal. App. 3d 590, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1979). In rejecting the California Trout Associa-
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and attempts to overturn these decisions by statute have failed.
The reasons for the political infeasibility of instream appropriadon and minimum streamflow programs illustrate the need for a
system allowing purchase of currently held water rights. Politically powerful water management interests such as municipal and
agricultural users8 1 perceive instream appropriation and minimum streamflow programs as threats to water development and
policy would "tie up" much of
flexibility.8 2 They fear that either
83
California's unallocated water.
By contrast, a reallocation of water through the purchase of
currently diverted water to augment depleted instream flows
would neither tie-up unallocated water, nor constrain future
water development. In fact, a 1982 Assembly Office of Research
study found that almost twenty percent of current agricultural
water users would be willing to sell all or part of the water which
they presently control.8 4 Water users who wish to sell all or part
of their water might support a proposal which increases the
number of prospective purchasers. 85
tion's application for an instream appropriation, the California Court of Appeals referenced the history of California Water law cases which have uniformly evidenced the basic
common element of possession. CaliforniaTrout, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
674. However, the court relied primarily on a strict interprqtation of CAL. WATER CODE
§ 1260 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990), which stipulates the information that an appropriative rights applicant must include regarding its proposed diversion structure and point
of diversion.

In a dissent from this decision, then Court of AppealsJustice Cruz Reynoso pointed
out that the application of water to a beneficial use, not physical control, is the significant element of an appropriative right. California Trout, 90 Cal. App. 3d. at 823, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 676. He argued that CAL. WATER CODE § 1260 "requires that an application for
a permit to appropriate set forth information regarding diversion and construction only
if such diversion or construction is contemplated by the applicant." Id.
In upholding the Board's decision to reject the Fish and Game's application for an
instream appropriation, the court in Fullerton relied less on statutes and instead emphasized "the possessory nature of an appropriative Water right [which] has long been recognized." Fullerton, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 596, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 522. The Fullerton court
also pointed out that the California Legislature has rejected instream flow reservation
programs. l at 602, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 526. Finally, the court raised the specter.of large
quantities of water being "tied up" if the Board issued many instream appropriative
rights. Id. at 604, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
81. R. GOTTLIEB, A LIFE OF ITS OWN: THE PorrIcs AND POWER OF WATER 3-20.9094 (1988).
82. Shupe, supra note 12, at 10, 18.
83. Id.
84. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CAL. LEGISLATURE. A MARKETING APPROACII TO
ALLOCATION 41-43 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 AOR REPORT].

WATER

85. Farmer'sOffer: $4 Millionfor River Surplus, Sacramento Bee. April 7. 1989. at A3,
col. 2.
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C. Protecting Instream Values Through Administrative andJudicial
Modification of Water Rights
California's history of allowing diversionary water uses has

left a legacy of depleted streamflows and has threatened already
diminished instream values.8 6 Thus, restoring instream values by
augmenting instream flows requires the reduction or elimination
of current diversions. Recent judicial rulings have increased the
state's authority to use reserved jurisdiction, change proceedings, and the public trust to modify water rights, in order to protect and enhance instream values. However, the efficacy of these
mechanisms is limited and they are politically and legally
questionable.
1.

Current law providingfor protection of instream values through

modification of existing water rights.
Reserved jurisdiction. When the SWRCB issues a permit, it
reserves jurisdiction by including a condition that allows it to
later reopen the permit and rewrite specific terms to account for
changing needs and conditions.8 7 This policy is not immune
from the criticisms made of other applications of the Board's
terms and conditions authority.
One criticism is that reserving jurisdiction to protect instream

values is a relatively recent and statutorily limited practice. 8 8Another criticism is that modifying permit conditions after
86. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
87. In 1958, the Board first "reserved jurisdiction" to allow "coordination" of different units of the Central Valley Project (CVP). In 1959, the Legislature codified this
process but provided that it could only occur under two conditions: (1) when there was
inadequate information to finalize a condition; and, (2) when, as in the case of the CVP,
different parts of a project must be coordinated. CAL. WATER CODE § 1394 (West 1971
& Supp. 1990). See also A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 59. Moreover, the Board was
limited to reserving jurisdiction only as long as "reasonably necessary" and never "after
the issuance of the license." CAL. WATER CODE § 1394 (1971).
The Board recently began including permit terms which assert its general "continuing authority" to amend permit terms and conditions. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, §
780(a) (1987). This provision references the Board's authority to prevent "unreasonable uses" of water and its evolving authority to protect "public trust values."
88. However, even in instances where a condition reserving jurisdiction was not
originally included in a permit, the courts, by adopting a broad reading of the legislative
limits to reserved jurisdiction, may allow the modification of permit terms. In a recent
ruling on the state's authority to regulate water rights, a state Court of Appeals stated
that, "[als long as the Board hal reserved jurisdiction to impose conditions , . . in at
least one of the [Central Valley] [Piroject permits, it retained the power and jurisdiction
to 'coordinate' the permits and impose similar conditions upon all." United States v.
State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 129, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 187.
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a project is operating and rehabilitating damaged instream values
may require a substantial and costly change in the allocation of
the water.8 9 If the project has been operating for some time, the
water needed to re-establish instream values may have to come
from established uses. To date, federal and state water management agencies have been unwilling to forego diversionary uses of
water to re-establish instream values. 90
An example of the Board's reluctance to utilize reserved jurisdiction to enhance instream values is found in its decisions regarding the Bureau of Reclamation's (Bureau) New Melones
Dam. 91 In its permit allowing the Bureau to impound water at
the New Melones Dam, the Board reserved 98,000 af/yr for fish
and wildlife protection along with the option to later revise these
releases upon review by the Bureau and the Department of Fish
and Game.92 However, the Board has not modified the New
Melones permit terms to increase flows, even though Fish and
Game now estimates that nearly three times more water is
needed to protect instream values.93 Indeed, as discussed below,
the Board may actually decrease protection of instream values affected by the New Melones Dam.
A final criticism is that instream flows increased by reserved
Thus, at least in the case of the federal Central Valley Project, and possibly in the California State Water Project, the Board will retain almost indefinite authority to impose
new terms and conditions. Arguably, this authority may be applied in a manner which
protects instream values.
89. As one commentator points out:
In many instances the reservation of stream flow and water quality adequate to
maintain fish, costs little to reserve beforehand and thus to avoid the irreversibility. [sic] If, however, water is committed entirely to other uses, die vendible
uses such as power, irrigation and municipal and industrial water supply then
undoing the commitment and restoring water quantity and quality and fish and
wildlife habitat is likely to be too costly to justify.
F. Bollman, Instrean Values, Memorandum prepared for the Governor's Commission
to Review California Water Rights Law 8 (April 3, 1979) (copy on file with the Stanford
Environmental Law Society).
90. For example, in the case of the Trinity River, the Bureau increased the downstream flows from Lewiston Dam in an attempt to assess the potential of reinstating the
devastated salmon fishery. However, when drought conditions decreased the quantity
of water available, the Bureau cut back this "experiment." Although die County ofTrinity brought suit to maintain downstream flows, the court refused to compel the Bureau
to continue downstream flows where the benefit to devastated salmon fisheries could
not be conclusively proved. County ofTrinity v. Andrus, 438 F. Supp. 1368, 1386-1387
(1977).
91. D-1422,supra note 57, at 21.
92. Id.
93. A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 53-54.
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jurisdiction authority may later be appropriated. The transient
nature of the protection afforded is demonstrated by provisions
in the Board's decision allowing the Bureau to divert water at the
New Melones Dam on the Stanislaus River. Although the permit
recognized instream values, it did not prevent any significant impairment of those values. It instead discussed "deferring significant impairment of upstream recreational values until a need for
other uses is demonstrated." 94 This amounted to a Board decision that "the river not be destroyed until it was necessary to do
so. In this sense, D-1422 is only a stay of execution ....
Change proceedings. In instances where the Board does not reserve jurisdiction to amend a permit, it may still modify a water
right if application is made for a change in the originally permitted place of use, purpose of use, or point of diversion for the
water. 96 Based on the requirement that changes in water use
"not operate to the injury of any legal user of the water,"'97 the
Board may deny such applications. Since instream uses are statutorily declared beneficial uses, 98 the Board has, on occasion, refused to approve an application to change a water use until the
protection of instream values is addressed. 9 However, as with
other forms of protection available to the Board, the duration of
benefits provided by each Board is limited to its own tenure. Any
additional flows which a Board may mandate in approving a
"change petition" are available for eventual appropriation.
Moreover, the Board's authority to deny applications is restricted
to a mere protection against injury to instream uses and cannot
provide for their enhancement.' 0 0
2. Recent judicialexpansion of the State's authority to modify
existing water rights: the public trust doctrine.
The administrative and legislative failure of a minimum
streamflow program' and the judicial rejection of instream ap94. D-1422, supra note 57, at 28.
95. Comment, Allocation of Water from Federal Reclamation Projects: Can the States Decide?, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 343, 357 (1974).
96. CAL. WATER CODE § 1701 (West 1971).
97. Id. § 1702 (West 1971).
98. Id. § 1243 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990).
99. See A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 61.
100. O'Brien, New Conditionsfor Old Water Rights: An Examination of the Sources and
Limits of State Authority, 33 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1, 24-15 (1987) [hereinafter
New Conditions].
101. See supra notes 86 to 100 and accompanying text.
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propriations10 2 produced, in the early 1980s, "a political stalemate in California with regard to the protection of uses of
water."1 0 3 Instream flow advocates responded to this stalemate
by suing to expand judicial and administrative authority to protect instream values. 10 4 Their efforts were often directed at finding legal mechanisms to reallocate water from current diversions
by modifying and even nullifying state-granted water rights
which harmed instream values.' 0 5 In the course of these suits,
the authority of California's courts and the SWRCB to modify
water rights has expanded significantly. This section analyzes the
sources of this authority and the extent to which it may be used
to protect and enhance instream flows.
The public trust doctrine grew out of Roman and English Parliamentary recognition "that certain natural resources are so intrinsically valuable to the public that they cannot be exclusively
owned by any person."'' 0 Initially, the doctrine was employed in
the United States to prevent states from totally abrogating their
control of tidelands. 0 7 While tidelands could support both private development and public uses,' 0 8 owners of such trust land in
102. Id.
103. Instream Flows and the Public Trust, supra note 36, at 107.
104. In the most noted example of such a suit, the National Audubon Society
sought to enjoin the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADIWP) from exercising water rights which allowed it to divert water from the streams which flowed into
Mono Lake. For a discussion of this case and its implications, see infra notes 123-133
and accompanying text.
105. For a discussion of some of the legal doctrines being considered by instream
flow groups, see Instream Flows and the Public Trust, supra note 36, at 104-05 and accompanying citations.
106. J. BAGLEY, D. LARSON & L. KAPALOSKI, ADAPTING APPROPRIATION WATER LAW
TO ACCOMMODATE EqUITABLE CONSIDERATION OF INSTREAMt FLOW UsEs 51, (Utah Water
Research Laboratory, Water Resources Planning Series No. P-83/06, 1983). For a discussion of the origins of the public trust doctrine, see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: EffectiveJudidal Intervention, 68 Micii. L REv. 473, 475-78 (1970).
107. In invalidating the Illinois Legislature's grant of most of Chicago's Lake Michigan shoreline to a private railroad company, the Supreme Court noted:
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave
them entirely under the use and control of private parties ... than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation
of the peace.
Illinois Central R. R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
108. Multiple compatible uses of tidelands were made possible, in part, by the limited number of court-sanctioned public trust uses. "The uses permitted the public originally included only navigation for commerce and incidental fishing rights." A.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 16.
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California were on notice that their ownership was not absolute.
The California Supreme Court stated:
[Private owners of trust land] own the soil, subject to the easement of the public for the public uses of navigation and commerce, and to the right of the state, as administrator and
controller of these public uses and the public trust therefor, to
enter upon and possess the same for the preservation and advancement of the public uses and to make such changes and
improvements
as may be deemed advisable for those
10 9
purposes.

The formerly limited number of public trust uses recognized as
legitimate were dramatically expanded in 1971 when the California Supreme Court ruled in Marks v. Whitney" 0 that:
public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. In administering the
trust the state is not burdened with an outmoded classificationfavoring
one mode of utilization over another (citations omitted). There is a
growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands ...

is the preservation of those lands in

their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for
scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and
I which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area. I
Although Marks expanded the uses the state could protect
under the public trust rubric, this broader scope of protection
was largely associated with coastal tidelands" 1 2 until 1981, when
the doctrine's scope was expanded to include the riparian lands
next to non-tidal navigable bodies of water. In 1981, the California Supreme Court ruled "that the applicability of the public
trust doctrine does not turn upon whether a body of water is subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, but upon whether it is navigable in fact." ' " 3 Despite this broad assertion, the public trust
109.
110.
111.
Schneider

People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 598-99 (1913).
Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796. (emphasis supplied).
points out that, "[t]oday, the range of allowable public [trust] uses has expanded to include boating, bathing, fishing, hunting, and recreation." A. SCHNEIDER,
supra note 12, at 16-17.
112. "[Mlost of the public trust litigation has involved the land, typically in situations where tidelands may be or have been filled for development with an incidental
impact on public nonconsumptive uses of water." Dunning, The Significance of California's
Public Trust Easementfor California Water Rights Law, 14 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 357, 359 (1980)
[hereinafter Public Trust Easement]. See also, Comment, Lyon and Fogerty: Unprecedented Extensions of the Public Trust, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1138, 1142 (1982).
113. State of California v. Superior Court of Lake County, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 227, 625
P. 2d. 239, 249, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 706 (1981).
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doctrine was generally invoked only to prevent riparian land use
endangerment of the public trust,' 1 4 or to prevent physical obstructions placed within navigable waterways." 5 No case had addressed whether the public trust doctrine could prevent the
exercise of diversionary water rights which were found to harm
trust values.
By the early 1980s, advocates of the public trust doctrine had

produced a significant body of literature which advocated that
state-granted water rights should also be held subject to the public trust doctrine.' 1 6 These commentators argued that the state
should modify existing water rights in order to preserve land in
its natural state,' 1 7 as suggested in Marks. If water rights could
be determined to be within the scope of the state's trust responsibility, then the state's discretion to grant permanent rights to the
resource would be curtailed. According to an influential commentator of that time, the public trust vests the public with rights
of use which:
are paramount to private rights; the private rights are burdened
both by public use "easements" and by the potential exercise of
the State's power to administer the public trust; and the State
has special or "fiduciary" duties to advance and respect the
purposes of the trust, which limit its general powers
of govern18
ment to alienate or deal with the trust resource. 1

Advocates of an expansive public trust doctrine hoped that it
would restrict the state's ability to grant freely diversionary water
rights which are detrimental to instream values." 9 Most importantly, instream flow advocates sought a legal basis for challeng114. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal. 3d
515, 606 P. 2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied sub nor. Santa Fe Land Improvemcnt
Co. v. City of Berkeley, 499 U.S. 840 (1980) (state retains responsibility to protect public
trust uses of tidelands even after they are conveyed to private parties).
115. See, e.g., People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152
(1884) (enjoining hydraulic mining activities which filled rivers and streams with
sediment).
116. A symposium on "The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and
Management" appeared in the Winter 1980 issue of the University of California at Davis
Law Review and includes a collection of articles on the subject. 14 U. C. DAvIS L Rv.
(1980).
117. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 1, at 255-67.
118. A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 11.
119. In discussing the effect of the public trust on the alienation of land, a commentator pointed out that "although dearly the state may extinguish the public trust
easement, such extinction requires more than would be demanded for alienation of ordinary state property. Frequent judicial references to these lands as held in the state's
.sovereign' capacity express a presumption that the public rights represented by the
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ing state-granted water rights found to interfere with trust

20
values. 1

Current appropriators were concerned about the prospect of
applying the public trust doctrine to established water rights.
They argued that alternative uses of water were considered during the water right application process.' 2 1 Moreover, it was argued that protecting trust values at the expense of current
diversions might result in reallocations of water which would
22
hurt California's economy.

The California Supreme Court sought to balance the concerns of trust advocates and current water right holders when it
ruled in NationalAudubon Society v. Superior Court ofAlpine County 1 25
that the state's power to protect public trust values extended to
water rights.' 24 The Audubon decision established the state's authority to take trust values into consideration when it grants and
reconsiders water rights. 125 The state is also empowered to reeasement will be extinguished only in the most justifiable of cases." Public Trust Easement, supra note 112, at 365.
Yet, even in land use cases, the doctrine has not worked to bar absolutely the conveyance of resources. For example, the state was found to be properly exercising its
trust responsibility when it chose to advance non-trust uses which threatened trust values. See Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 189, 273 P. 797, 815 (1928) (allowing a nontrust use, drilling for oil, to endanger trust uses, but affirming the state's authority to
restrict such non-trust uses at its discretion). In this respect, non-trust uses were characterized as "non-vested" rights. The state could also choose between competing trust
uses. Such a choice might harm the trust values identified in Mlarks, but is within the
state's authority as long as it advances another trust value. For a discussion of the state's
authority to make such choices in managing trust resources, see Public Trust Easement,
supra note 112, at 369-74.
120. Lazarus, ChangingConceptions of Property and Sovereignty in NaturalResources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REV. 631, 650 (1986). See also Walston, The
Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA
CLAGR L. REV. 63 (1982).
121. Walston, supra note 120, at 77-78.
122. Id. at 79-80. Additionally, protection of trust uses in one area may threaten
or endanger trust uses in other areas. This dilemma is demonstrated by the Mono Lake
controversy where decreased diversions of water from streams feeding into Mono Lake
may be offset by increased exports from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. Littleworth,
The Public Trust vs. the Public Interest, 19 PAc. L.J. 1201, 1207, 1210 (1988).
123. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d
419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
124. Id. at 425-26, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349. Specifically, the court
found that the state's authority and responsibility under the trust extends to protect
"navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of nonnavigable tributaries." Id. at
437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
125. Id. at 426, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349. While theAudubon decision
allows the state to grant diversionary water rights for uses of the water which may harm
trust values, the court described these water rights as nonvested and thus subject to the
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consider existing rights' 26 and reallocate water from diversions
which harm trust values.' 27 Moreover, the decision provided instream flow advocates with standing to challenging diversionary
water rights. 128 When faced with such challenges, courts or the
Board may decide to modify present water rights based on the
29
holding in Audubon. 1
The Audubon decision does not, however, provide clear guidelines for when modifications of present water rights are war-

ranted or necessary. 130 Although this decision requires the state

to protect trust values "whenever feasible,"' 13 1 it also seeks to

avoid the economic dislocation which might result from substantial reallocations of water.' 3

2

Thus, Audubon falls far short of en-

suring that water rights which interfere with the preservation of
13
trust values will always be modified.

3

The value of the public trust doctrine as a tool for modifying
water rights has yet to be determined. At least four factors may
undermine its potential scope and effectiveness and prevent the
doctrine from being commonly used to protect instream values.
These four potential obstacles are (1) the burden of proof faced

by plaintiffs in environmental litigation; (2) the limited application of the public trust doctrine; (3) possible conflicts between
state's "continuous supervision and control." Id. at 425, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr.
at 349. And while the ruling leaves intact the state's authority to grant water rights that
are free of the trust, such rights can only be granted where they are in furtherance of one
or more trust uses. These conveyances will be rare because the court agreed with "decisions and commentators [who] assume that 'trust uses' relate to uses and activities in the
vicinity of the lake, stream, or tidal reach at issue." Id. at 440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal.
Rptr. at 360. California's Attorney General unsuccessfully argued that all "public uses"
of water are trust uses. Had this theory prevailed, diversions made by public agencies or
found to be for public benefit would be free of the state's continuing trust authority.
126. Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. 365. The Audubon court established
that the public trust doctrine "bars [LA]DWP or any other party from claiming a vested
right to divert waters once it becomes clear that such diversions harm the interests protected by the public trust." Id. at 426, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349. For a
discussion of the Court's motive, see Littleworth, supra note 122.
127. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 445-48, 658 P.2d at 726-29, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363-66.
128. Id. at 431 n.1l, 658 P.2d at 716 n.l 1, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353 n.l 1.
129. Id. at 446-48, 658 P.2d at 727-29, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-66.
130. See Comment, Reconciling the Public Trust and Appropriative laterRights in Califor.
nia, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 219, 227 (1984) [hereinafter Reconciling the Public Trust].
131. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
132. Id. at 426, 447-48, 658 P.2d at 712, 728-29, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349. 365-66.
133. As one noted commentator pointed out: "the state has more leeway to deviate
from fulfillment of the trust where water rights are at stake than where rights to land are
involved." Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western il'ater Law." Discord or Harmony?
30 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1, 17-32 (1984) [hereinafter Discordor Harmony].
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the public trust doctrine and the "takings" clause of the Fifth
Amendment; and (4) political reactions which may undercut or
limit the doctrine.
The burden of prooffaced by instreamflow advocates. It is unlikely
that the Board or the courts can or will seek out stream diversions to determine whether they are in compliance with the public trust doctrine. 134 Thus, instream flow advocates must initiate
legal actions in order to challenge existing water rights.' 3 The
primary hurdles facing environmentalists in meeting this burden
are the difficulty of ascertaining the level of environmental damage and the problem
of determining causation for a given envi36
ronmental harm. 1

To prove that a diversion should be reduced or ended, instream flow advocates need to demonstrate that instream values
are indeed threatened. 13 7 In addition, they must prove that diversions are the cause of the harm to instream values. The Mono
Lake controversy demonstrates that obtaining proof of damage
and causation is time consuming and expensive.138 Furthermore,
such data is highly susceptible to 3methodological
scrutiny and ar9
guments of alternative causality.1

134. Reconciling the Public Trust, supra note 130, at 227 n.61.
135. The Audubon decision allows private plaintiffs to initiate Board proceedings
which challenge water rights. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 449, 658 P.2d at 730, 189 Cal. Rptr.
at 366-67. Alternatively, even before they have exhausted such administrative remedies,
public trust advocates may initiate law suits. The court found that the Board and the
courts enjoy "concurrent original jurisdiction in suits to determine water rights" Id. at
451, 658 P.2d at 731, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
136. For an excellent discussion of the dispositive nature of the burden of proof in
environmental litigation, see Belsky, Environmental Policy Law in the 1980's: Shifting Back
the Burden of Proof, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1984); Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden
of Proof, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 107-10.
137. Ironically, if trust advocates are successful in showing that instream values are
depleted, damaged, or endangered, diverters may be able to argue that successful reestablishment of instream values is too improbable to merit a reduction of present diversions. Littleworth, supra note 122, at 1211. See also, Comment, Water Law Public Trust
Doctrine, 24 NAT. REs.J. 809, 822 (1984).
138. See Instream Flows and the Public Trust, supra note 36, at 123 nn. 1-5.
139. The LADWP's diversions lowered the lake level, which caused problems of
increased salinity, decreased gull roosting on the lake's islands, and diminished air quality in the region. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 429-31, 658 P.2d at 715-716, 189 Cal. Rptr. at
352-353. However, the LADWP has asserted that the reduction in brine shrimp in
Mono Lake is not related to increases in salinity, and that the transformation of Mono
Lake's islands to peninsulas (which increases predatory access to gull rookeries) is not
the cause of declines in gull populations. Id. at 430, 658 P.2d at 715-716, 189 Cal. Rptr.
at 352-353. As to the impacts on gulls the "[LA]DWP suggest[ed] numerous other
causes, such as increased ambient temperatures and human activities, and claims that
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The limited scope of the public trust doctrine. A major question left
unanswered by the Audubon decision is the extent to which the
public trust doctrine covers artificial bodies of water and nonnavigable streams. The California Court of Appeals recently
held that artificial bodies of water do not fall within the purview
of the public trust doctrine.' 40 Thus, while public reservoir operators are required to provide public access for recreational purposes, 14 1 the public trust may not be a useful tool for requiring
them to maintain their facilities in a manner which protects instream values. The court also found "substantial reason to conclude that the public trust doctrine does not extend to
nonnavigable
streams to the extent they do not affect navigable
42
waters." 1
The failure of one appellate court to extend the public trust
doctrine to include non-navigable streams (primary spawning
habitat for fish) and artificial bodies of water (primary habitat for
recreationalists), demonstrates the need for an additional mechanism to protect instream values. These limitations also demonstrate that the state's judiciary is not unanimous in the belief that
the state's instream flow crisis should be resolved by modifying
existing water rights.
The public trust doctrine and the "takings question." A considerable
debate has addressed the possibility that federal courts may consider public trust modifications of water rights to be a "taking"
under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 43 Determining whether modifying a water right constitutes a "taking for
a public use" raises a considerable number of questions which
are beyond the scope of this article. 44 It is important to note
the joining of some islands with the mainland is offset by the emergence of new islands
due to the lake's recession." Id. at 430, 658 P.2d at 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353. Finally,
the LADWP denied daims that diversions affect air quality. Id. at 431, 658 P.2d at 716.
189 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
140. Golden Feather Community Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 209 Cal.
App. 3d 1276, 1285, 257 Cal. Rptr. 836. 842 (1989).
141. See Comment, PublicRecreation and Subdivisions on Lakes and Reservoirs in Californma, 23 STAN. L REv.811, 825 (1971).
142. Golden FeatherCommunity Ass'n, 209 Cal. App.3d at 1284, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
143. This amendment states, inpart, "[no] private property [shall] be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
144. Some of these questions include: (I) Whether water rights constitute property
under the fifth amendment; (2) whether public trust rights are dormant rights which
predate state granted water rights; (3) whether ajudicial finding that the public trust is a
taking would entirely negate its application or simply require the state to pay compensation; (4)how much compensation is adequate for a water right which cost almost noth-
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that a suit challenging California's public trust doctrine in federal
court "will occur in a context in which the U.S. Supreme Court,
already arguably hostile to the public trust doctrine as understood by the California courts, may have hardened its position on
1 45
when a taking exists."'

Politicalresponses to the public trust doctrine. It is also possible that
the public trust doctrine will be victimized by its own success. As
discussed above, security of water rights is one of the fundamental tenets of appropriative systems. Increasing the security of
water rights is a consistent theme in both legislative enactments
and judicial decisions.1 46 The application of the public trust doctrine to modify long-standing appropriations clearly jeopardizes
all water rights. Indeed, "simply by deciding that water rights
cannot be made secure from challenge and reduction of unpredictable dimension, the Court has already altered the assumptions on which planning and finance of water supplies are
based."' 147 If the public trust doctrine substantially threatens
their rights, current water right holders will seek to limit its application. One influential commentator recently noted: "If the
public interest of the state as a whole should be victimized by
public trust overreaching, a reaction in the' legislature
or through
48
the initiative process is more than likely."'
III.

THE NEXT STEP IN PROTECTING INSTREAM VALUES

This article has thus far demonstrated the limited efficacy of
current mechanisms designed to protect instream values. Moreover, it has shown that the commonly proposed alternatives lack
political and legal feasibility. This article proposes that the next
ing to obtain; and (5) whether the state would be required to compensate water right
holders for diversion and impoundment facilities rendered useless by a public trust action.

For a discussion of questions arising under a "takings" analysis of the public trust
doctrine, see New Conditions, supra note 100; Littleworth, supra note 122; Dunning, State
EquitableApportionment of Western Water Resources, 66 NEB. L. REV. 76, 97 (1987) [hereinafter State Equitable Apportionment]; Goldsmith & Calonne, The California Public Trust DoctrineUnsettled Law, Unsettled Rights Cal. Real Prop.J., Fall 1986, at 13; Somach, The Financial
Impacts of Instream Protection, 33 Rocky Min. Min. L. Inst. 25-1, 25-29 to 25-31 (1987);
Comment, The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine in Water Law, 15 Pac.
L.J. 1291 (1984).

145.
146.
158 Cal.
147.
148.

Instream Flows and the Public Trust, supra note 36, at 115-16.
See In Re Waters of Long Valley Creek System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656,
Rptr. 350 (1979); CAL. WATER CODE § 109(a) (West Supp. 1990).
Goldsmith & Calonne, supra note 144, at 13.
Littleworth, supra note 122, at 1223.
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step in protecting instream values should be the use of marketbased mechanisms or incentives to transfer water from current
diversions to instream flows for the protection of instream
values.
California is embarking upon a new direction in water management which emphasizes conservation and reallocation. The
Legislature has implemented statutory changes which encourage
water marketing, and as a result, various types of transfers are
currently taking place. However, in most cases these transfers do
not provide long-term protection for instream values, nor do
they create net improvement in the environmental status quo.
This article thus proposes a set of further statutory reforms.
A.

New Directionsin California Water Management

As a result of reduced opportunities for water development,
changes in water demand, and alterations in the political strength
of various state water interests, California water management is
moving away from supply side management, toward equitable
apportionment, efficient use, and reallocation of existing water
supplies.
Historically, California has met increases in demand for water
by constructing new impoundments or increasing the quantity of
water diverted from streams.' 49 Today, most of California's economically and technically feasible water impoundment sites have
been developed, and the opportunities for such supply-side
water management are decreasing.' 50 Federal funding for water
development has also diminished, thus removing an important
driving force behind supply-side management.' 5
Over the next twenty years, the nature of California's demand
for water will change significantly. Agricultural water demand is
expected to grow only slightly, if at all, 5 2 while urban water uses
are projected to grow by thirty-two percent.'5 3 Naturally, these
changes in water use will be accompanied by changes in the relative political strength of agricultural and urban interests. "' In
149. See generally
150. CAL. DEP'T

FINAL REPORT, supra note 2.
OF WVATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, 1, 39
MIN.

160-87,

CALIFORNIA WATER:

(1987) [hereinafter DWR BuLLEtN 160-871.

151. Driver, The Effect of Reclamation Law on 'oluntanr IWater Trasfers,. 33 Rocsy MN-r.
L. INST., 26-1, 26-2 (1988).
152. DWR BULLETIN 160-87, supra note 150, at 10-11.
153. IdL at 5-8.
154. Shupe, supra note 12, at 4. The political strength and will of urban popula-
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fact, agriculture's relative political power is already beginning to
wane.' 55 As California's urban population grows, it will become
better able to achieve its goals of increasing water quality, 56 and
57
enhancing instream recreational values.'
Because these increasingly predominant urban interests are at
odds with agricultural water use,1 58 which is responsible for depleting streamflows and degrading water quality, 5 9 the longstanding development coalition between California's agricultural
and municipal water interests will continue to fragment. 6 ° For
example, some elected representatives of the urban population
are already becoming outspoken advocates of the need to solve
the state's water needs through reallocation, rather than through
16 1
water development.

Federal and state water agencies are responding to these
changes by developing water supply plans which emphasize water
management over water development. The Bureau recently issued a report declaring that its mission must change from one
based on "federally supported construction" of water development facilities to effective and "sensitive resource management".' 62 Similarly, California's Department of Water Resources
(DWR)' 65 has recognized that using water more efficiently and
tions are illustrated by their self-perceived ability to significantly affect the SWRCB's
decision to withdraw and reconsider key elements of its preliminary draft report for the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Bay-Delta Estuary Hearings. Memorandum from C. Boronkay,
General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California to Metropolitan Water District Tour Guest (January 25, 1989) (copy on file with the Stanford
Environmental Law Society) (discussing the SWRCB's decision to redraft a water plan).
155. R. GOTrLIEB, supra note 81, at 94-103.
156. Id. at 155-98.
157. Erman, Clark & Perrine, Environmental Quality and Recreation, in COMPETITION
FOR CALIFORNIA WATER 98, at 101-02 (1982).
158. For a discussion of how urban and agricultural water interests have begun to
conflict in one California city, see Water-Hungry Fresno Forced to Put and End to its Free Ride,
San Francisco Chron., May 1, 1989, at A3, col. 1.

159. See ASSEMBLY

OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CAL. LEGISLATURE, TIlE LEACHING FIELDS:

A NONPOINT THREAT TO GROUNDWATER (1985). Agricultural water use, which constitutes 85% of the State's consumptive use, is frequently becoming the target of calls for

reallocation.
160. See generally R. GOTTLIEB, supra note 81, at 3-33.
161. Two of the leading advocates of water reallocation are California Congressman George Miller (Contra Costa) and California Assemblyman Richard Katz
(Sepulveda).
162. U. S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ASSESSMENT '87 - A NEW DIRECTION FOR TIlE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1987) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT '87].
163. The California Department of Water Resources is the state agency responsible for developing and overseeing the efficient allocation of California state-controlled
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reallocating conserved water are the most promising mechanisms
for meeting California's future water demands."t 6 Furthermore,
California's SWRCB is beginning to apply its long-dormant authcrity to limit water uses to a "reasonable amount",' 65 and has
attempted to create a new water ethic focusing on conservation
66
and reallocation.
California's courts and Legislature are also responding to the
state's changing water needs and interests. Both institutions apparently agree that reallocation will replace development as the
basis of California water management.167 The state's courts are
encouraging reallocation by expanding administrative and judicial authority to modify water rights, 68 and in some instances
have balanced water interests rather than strictly applying the appropriative rights priority doctrine.' 6 9 By contrast, the Legislawater resources. The DWR operates the State Water Project, California's state aqueduct
conveyance facility, and also works closely with the Central Valley Project and federal,
state, and local water resource agencies.
164. DWR BuLsLErN 160-87, supra note 150, at 1.
165. For a discussion of previous unwillingness to adjudicate unreasonable uses of
water, see Comment, Liability Rules as a Solution to the Problem of II'aste in ilkstern 11'aitr Law:
An Economic Analysis, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 671 (1988).
During the late 1970s, the Board and the DWRjointly promulgated regulations for
investigating and adjudicating alleged unreasonable uses of water. CAL. CODE OF REGULATIONS tit. 23 §§ 4000-4007. The most significant application of this new scrutiny addresses concerns that the Imperial Irrigation District (lID) is engaging in wasteful water
management practices. See Comment, Imperial Irrigation District . State Water Resources
ControlBoard Board as Arbiter of Reasonable and Beneficial Use of California Water, 19
PAc. J. 1565, 1580-96 (1988). After determining that the lID was using water in an
unreasonable manner, the Board issued Water Rights Decision 1600 (D-1600), which
required the IID to develop a plan to eliminate wasteful water practices. Failure to end
water waste could result in a reduction of the IID's water right for the amount of unreasonably used water. Id.
166. The new water ethic was proposed in the first draft Water Quality Control
Plan in the Bay Delta Estuary Hearings. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,
WATER

QUALITY

CONTROL PLAN FOR SALINITY: SAN FRANcisco BAY-SACRA

tENTo-SAJOA-

QUIN DELTA ESTUARY (October 1988) at 1-6, 1-7. The water ethic consists of six points:
conservation, reclamation, conjunctive use, sharing responsibility among all beneficial
users for protecting water quality and maintaining adequate flows in the Delta, construction of physical facilities for better management, and controlling pollution at the source
rather than releasing freshwater to enhance water quality. Id. This water ethic will likely
be modified in the final Water Quality Control Plan, but the emphasis on effective water
management will remain.
167. See O'Brien, 11'ater Marketing in California , 19 PAc. UJ. 1165, 1166 (1988).
168. See People v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1976); Metropolitan Water District v. Imperial Irrigation District, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160. 231 Cal. Rptr.
283 (1986).
169. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82.
119-20, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 180 (1986). The decision appears to give the Board wide
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through water

Recent Legislation Encouraging Water Marketing

As a result of increased water scarcity and increased pressure
for reallocation, the Legislature has enacted a number of statutory changes encouraging the use of water marketing. While
these changes are not intended to directly protect instream values, they do provide a structure that enhances the feasibility of
market-based reallocation for protection of instream values.
They also indicate the Legislature's desire to increase the use of
market forces and reallocation to address California's water
problems.
In 1980, the Legislature made it "the established policy of
this state to facilitate the voluntary transfer of water and water
rights where consistent with the public welfare of the place of
export and the place of import."'' Since then, the Legislature
has focused on attempts to encourage the reallocation of developed water made available through conservation measures.' 72
Additional legislative steps have been taken to reform the
SWRCB's administration of water transfers in order to encourage water marketing.' 73 For example, several statutes have
authority to reallocate and reprioritize water entitlements when creating water quality
control plans.
170. While some current right holders may seek to forestall any reallocation of
water, other right holders may respond to the threat posed by administrative and judicial reallocation by encouraging the Legislature to facilitate water marketing. As Colorado's former Governor Lamm recently pointed out, western "[flarmers are . . .
recognizing that their water is often worth more than their crops." LAMM, Foreword to B.
DRIVER, WESTERN WATER: TUNING THE SYSTEM at ii (1986) [hereinafter TUNING TIE

SYsTEM].
171. CAL. WATER CODE § 109(a) (West Supp. 1990).
172. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1010-1011 (West Supp. 1990). See also Gray, Draft
Report On Water Transfers In California: 1981-1989, 16 (1989) (unpublished document) (copy on file with the Stanford Environmental Law Society) [hereinafter Transfers
in California]. For example the Legislature required the DWR to establish a program to
facilitate water marketing. CAL. WATER CODE § 480 (West Supp. 1990). However, the
Legislature stipulated that the DWR shall "seek to facilitate [water marketing] transactions only ifthe water to be transferred is already developed and being diverted from a
stream ...or has been conserved." Id. (emphasis added).
A more general mandate requires the DWR, the Board, "and all other appropriate
state agencies to encourage voluntary transfers of water and water rights including ...
technical assistance to persons to identify and implement water conservation measures
which will make additional water available for transfer." Id. § 109(b).
173. Most water marketing transactions must be approved by the Board. CAL.
WATER CODE § 1701 (West 1971). The holder of an appropriative right issued by the
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been enacted to expedite the Board approval processes17 4 for the
temporary transfers of water or water rights 75 and for short-term
changes in water use necessitated by urgent conditions.1 76
In recent years, the Legislature has also passed laws aimed at
reforming the public entities which control most of California's
water. As a result of such legislation, the DWR for example, is
now required to provide to groups attempting to effect water
transfers information on potential water marketing transactions, 1 7 7 technical assistance,17 8 and part of its unused aqueduct
capacity.17 9 The Legislature has also suggested encouraging a
Board must obtain the Board's approval before changing her place of use, type of use,
or point of diversion. Id. Because some transactions involving entities with permits covering multiple uses and diversion points are exempted from this requirement. some Bureau and DWR transactions may avoid direct Board scrutiny. Similarly, appropriative
rights obtained before 1914 can be changed without Board approval. One condition of
change of purpose of use, place of use, or point of diversion, however, is that the change
not "injure" other users. Id. § 1706.
174. Legislation streamlining Board procedures followed observations by the Governor's Commission that the water rights application process was time consuming and in
need of reform. FRNAL. REPORT, supra note 2, at 69.
175. Temporary changes in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use that
will last for one year or less are temporary transfers of water. CAt. WATER CODE § 1728
(West Supp. 1990). California law now allows such temporary transfers for.
water that would have been consumptively used or stored by the permittee or
licensee in the absence of the proposed temporary change, would not injure
any legal user of the water, and would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or
other instream beneficial uses .... [C]onsumptively used' means the amount
of water which has been consumed through use by evapotranspiration, has percolated underground, or has been otherwise removed from use in the downstream water supply....
Id. § 1725. Within 60 days of receiving an application for a temporary transfer, the
Board must either approve the proposed changes or schedule a hearing on the application. Id. § 1727.
176. The Board is authorized to approve immediate changes in a permitee or licensee's place of use, point of diversion, or type of use. Id § 1435(a). The California
Assembly Office of Research, concerned that current law v,'as often inadequate to respond to emergency water management needs, suggested the implementation of legislation permitting temporary urgency changes. 1982 AOR REPORT, supra note 84, at 47. If
the Board determines that there is an "urgent need" to allow changes in the use of water
rights, that the proposed change is in the public interest, and that the proposed change
will not harm other water users or instream beneficial uses, the Board may approve
changes without requiring the applicant to comply with the other procedural requirements of the Water Code. CAL. WATER CODE § 1435(c) (West Supp. 1990). A "temporary urgency change" expires after 180 days, but the Board may renew the change as
long as it finds that the urgent condition still exists. Id. §§ 1440-1441. Significantly,
these provisions allow the Board to delegate the authority to approve urgency changes
to any of its employees. Id § 1435(d).
177. hd § 481.
178. Id. §§ 480-482.
179. Id § 1810. See also id. §§ 1811-1814.
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greater number of California's water districts, which "have to
date evidenced a cautious attitude toward water marketing,"t10 to
promote water marketing transactions.
Recognizing that "[m]any water management decisions can
best be made at a local or regional level,"'' the Legislature has
granted local water districts the authority to "sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise transfer water that is surplus to the needs of
the [district's] water users for use outside of the [district]"., 82 In
addition, the law now recognizes that in the area of water transfers, the authority of local water districts can override "any other
provision of law which contains more stringent limitations."''8 3
Presumably, this provision will prevent the application of provisions of the California Water Code which limit, impede, or prevent the sale, lease or exchange of water by districts. 84 Finally,
current legislation also seeks to facilitate water transfers through
local water districts by giving the districts control over the importing and exporting of water from their jurisdictions. 85
Although the Legislature has taken significant steps to free
water for transfer and to facilitate its transfer, its efforts have met
with only limited success. Moreover, current mechanisms have
not been sufficient to encourage necessary long-term reallocations for the protection of instream values.
C.

Current Status of Water Transfers in California and the West

Despite recent attempts at reallocation through water marketing,' 86 the transfers which have taken place have not significantly
180. O'Brien, supra note 167, at 1199.
181. CAL. WATER CODE § 380(c) (West Supp. 1990).
182. Id. § 382. Surplus water is defined as water which the district holds by virtue
of an appropriative right and which either the district finds to be in excess of its constituents' needs, or a water user within the district agrees to forgo the use of and which the
agency agrees to market. Another definition of surplus water allows an individual within
a district to determine that water which she possesses based on an appropriative right is
surplus to her needs. The right holder may then designate the water district as his agent
in marketing the water. Id. § 383.
183. Id. § 381.
184. For a discussion of such impediments, see C. T. LEE, THE TRANSFER OF
WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA

11-23 (Governor's Commission to Review California

Water Rights Law, Staff Paper No. 5 1977). The AOR recommended many of the legislative changes which were adopted to encourage water district participation in water
marketing. See generally 1982 AOR REPORT, supra note 84.
185. CAL. WATER CODE § 385 (West Supp. 1990).
186. Illustrative of the recent increase in market-based reallocation is a transfer
recently negotiated by the MWD. In September 1987, the MWD and Coachella Valley
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augmented instream flows or created a net benefit for instream

values.18 7 Twenty-three applications to transfer water were submitted to the Board over a nine-year period, 1981-1989.'" The

majority of the transfers approved by the Board "were for specific and very short-term purposes such as augmenting supply

during one irrigation season, conducting water quality studies,
maintaining instream flows during times of low natural flow, and
providing contingency supplies during the
1987-1989

drought."'' 8 9 Most of the approved water transfers lasted for less
than a year and were generally effected in response to previously
mandated flow requirements. Thus, instream flows were not increased as a result of transfer permit applications approved by
the Board.
Eight Temporary Urgency Changes have been approved by
,the Board for the purpose of environmental protection.190 These

included: the maintenance of water quality,' 9 ' the support of
salmon spawning and migration, 9 2 the provision of greater instream flows in the Delta,' and the supply of water to national

Water District announced an agreement on a plan whereby the MWD is to finance the
lining of the Coachella canal in return for entitlements to the conserved 30,000 af of
historic loss. VESTERN NEVORK, 2 WATER MARKET UPDATE, No. 1,at 9 (January 1988)
[hereinafter WATER MARKET UPDATE]. Similarly, the MWD and the Imperial Irrigation
District (lID) have agreed that the MWD will pay $92 million to the lID for constructing
conservation facilities along the IID canal in return for the delivery of 100,000 af/yr for
35 years. 2 WATER MARKET UPDATE, No. 12, at 4 (December 1988).
187. They have in fact generally been limited to temporary transfers of sater between large water development institutions for emergency situations such as droughts.
Transfers in California, see supra note 172, at 30. Many of the transfers have been made
for environmental purposes, but have been limited to obtaining alternative sources of
water to comply with existing environmental standards, and not for increasing instream
flows.
188. Id at 29.
189. Id. at 30.
190. Id. at 55.
191. Id at 63. From I/1/89 to 3/31/89, for example, the Bureau transferred
10,000 af to the DWR that allowed the Bureau to divert water at Clifton Court Forebay.
This substituted for reduced diversions at the Tracy Pumping Plant, which were needed
to comply with Delta water quality standards.
192. Id at 60. From 7/1/88 to 2/28/89, for example, the Bureau transferred
85,500 af to the DWR for the Kern National Wildlife Refuge (7,500 al) and the Delta
(48,000 af) and for maintaining water temperatures adequate to support salmon (30,000
aO.
193. Id at 58. From 12/1/87 to 2/28/88, for example, the Bureau transferred
10,000 af to the DWR to offset reduced diversions at the Tracy pumping plant requested
by the Department of Fish and Game to increase Delta streamflows and aid outmigration
of salmon.
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wildlife refuges in the San Joaquin Valley. 94 Similarly, these
temporary changes do not represent long term attempts to
achieve flow levels which exceed the levels already mandated.
The existing system of water transfers has thus done little to

benefit instream flows in California. By contrast, this article's
proposal for market-based reallocation seeks to encourage additional compensation-driven transfers of water and water rights
for the long-term protection and augmentation of instream

values.
Such an approach has succeeded in other Western states. In
Colorado, for example, a fishing club leased eighteen af of water
in 1989 to cover evaporation loss in its ponds, and is seeking to

purchase 24 af/yr of senior water rights for a permanent supply. "9' 5 In Nevada, the Nevada Waterfowl Association purchased
thirty-five af/yr from the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District
for the benefit of the Stillwater Wetlands. 96 And in Idaho,

a group of public and private entities led by the Nature Conservancy purchased 3,200 af of water from the Upper Snake
Water Bank for the protection of trumpeter swans.' 97 In
addition, the federal government,' 9 8 western state govern194. Id. at 57. From 9/1/87 to 4/30/88, for example, the Bureau transferred
10,000 af to the DWR so that the Bureau could supply the Kern National Wildlife Refuge for the maintenance of migratory waterfowl habitat.
A far greater number of transfers occurred among the CVP contractors themselves.
CVP contractors engaged in over 150 intra-CVP transfers a year. Such transfers between Bureau contractors are frequent and informal. These transfers occur with relative
ease because they are subject neither to the Board's jurisdiction nor to approval of the
Bureau. From 1981-1988, CVP engaged in over 1,200 transfers and transferred over 3
million af. Id. at 65.
195. 3 WATER MARKET UPDATE, supra note 186, No. 5, at 6 (May 1989). The leased
water cost $25/af.
196. Id. at No. 3 at 3 (March 1989). The water, which costs $214/af, is being
purchased to compensate for decreased instream flows in the Carson River.
197. Id. Other participants in the purchase were the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the city of Grand Prairie, Alberta, and the
Trumpeter Swan Society. Irrigators in the water district controlling the water bank
donated an additional 10,000 af to augment the instream flows. Id.
198. In December 1987, Congress approved $1 million for acquiring water rights
in the upper Colorado River Basin in an effort to protect three endangered fish species.
2 WATER MARKET UPDATE, supra note 186, No. 2, at 9 (February 1988). The allocation
could increase to "a minimum of $10 million in federal funds for water rights purchases,
and $5 million for hatcheries and other facilities to protect fish." Id. In addition, in
November of 1988, U.S. Senator Harry Reid of Nevada proposed legislation in Congress
"for the purchase of $16 million of water rights to improve the quantity and quality of
flows into federal wildlife areas in the Carson and Truckee river valleys of western Nevada." Id. at No. 12, at 8 (December 1988). Finally, in 1988, the Bureau of Reclamation
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ments, 19 9 and corporations2 0 0 have sought to protect instream

values through market-based reallocation.
D.

Authors' Proposed Statutory Changes to Encourage Market-based
Reallocationfor Instream Value Protection

The limitations of mechanisms which were created or modified to protect instream values, the new direction of California
water management, the shifting power of traditional water interests, and the Legislature's desire to encourage market-based solutions to California's water allocation problems all create a
context for making the purchase of instream flows the next step
in protecting California's instream values. The California Legislature should thus take steps to facilitate the ability of private
groups or individuals to acquire water, existing water rights, or
existing water entitlements for the express purpose of preserving
or enhancing fish, wildlife, or recreational values. Acquisition by
gift, exchange, or purchase should be encouraged.
A number of legal, institutional, and practical factors must be
addressed in proposing the expansion of market-based reallocation in California's current system of water law and management.
This section proposes several statutory changes to the California
Water Code which will help facilitate the reallocation of diverted
water to augment instream flows.2 0 ' The next section will discuss
how these statutory changes will facilitate the integration of marfunded the purchase of 9,500 af of water at $50/af for release from Deer Creek Reservoir in Utah for the purpose of maintaining a prime fishing stretch of the Provo River.
Id.
199. The Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks Department signed a purchase contract for 10,000 af of water at $2/af to protect rainbow and brown trout fisheries in the
Bitterroot River. 1 WATER MARKET UPDATE, supra note 186, No. 8, at 3 (August 1987).
Lander County, Nevada purchased 3,000 af of a senior irrigation right at $217/af "to
maintain a stable reservoir shoreline for recreational boating and fishing." Id. at No. 5,
at 3 (May 1987).
200. In 1987, the Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Company agreed to donate a large
conditional water right on Colorado's Gunnison River to the Nature Conservancy. The
river provides habitat for the river otter, the bald eagle, and the humpback chub-all
listed as endangered species at the state or federal levels. Id at No. 3, at 10 (March
1987). Furthermore, in 1988, Chevron Corporation donated $7.2 million of water
rights to the Nature Conservancy for recreation and wildlife use in the Gunnison River.
3 WATER MARKET UPDATE, supra note 186, No. 1, at 7 (January 1989).
201. Some of the reforms that are proposed to facilitate the purchase of instream
flows will arguably facilitate other types of water marketing transactions. A discussion of
the relative benefits of water marketing as a solution to other water problems is beyond
the scope of this article.
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ket-based reallocation into California's current water allocation
system.
To facilitate market-based reallocation of diverted water to instream flows for the protection of instream values, the California
Legislature should consider the following reforms:
A. Increase the security of appropriative rights reallocated to
increase instream flows either by:
1) Amending the California Water Code 20 2 to abolish the implied diversion requirement for appropriative rights; or
2) Amending the California Water Code to state that the
transfer of an appropriative right to an instream flow for the
purpose of protecting instream values shall not be restricted
by any diversion requirement.
B. Expedite reallocation of appropriated water to instream
flows by:
1) Streamlining the current SWRCB permit application process for the reallocation of instream flow rights by creating a
rebuttable presumption that no injury will occur to a downstream user or the public interest as a result of a voluntary
reallocation to instream flows; and
2) Providing for automatic approval of instream flow reallocations if the Board has not objected after receiving thirty
days notice; and
3) Modifying the standard of injury to other users from one
of no-injury to one of no-substantial-injury in the case of
reallocations for the protection of instream values.
C. Facilitate reallocation of water developed and distributed by
irrigation districts by:
1) Amending the California Water Code and the irrigation
districts' state charters to specifically allow irrigation districts
to contract with instream groups for the sale of water entitlements to protect instream values; and
2) Amending California Water Code § 22261 to allow the
sale of water rights by irrigation districts; and
3) Amending the California Water Code, or the irrigation
districts' state charters, or directing the SWRCB to establish
clear title to the water held by irrigation districts and
irrigators.
D. Encourage conservation of water developed and distributed
by irrigation districts by:
202.

CAL. WATER CODE

(West 1971 & Supp. 1990).
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1) Amending California Water Code § 1392 to allow irrigation districts and/or irrigators to profit on the sale of water
rights to instream groups; and
2) Amending the California Water Code, or the irrigation
districts' state charters to establish the validity of the irrigator's right to sell the unused portion of his water option or
entitlement.
E. Encourage conservation and facilitate reallocation of water
developed and distributed by the Bureau of Reclamation by:
1) Amending the California Water Code to encourage the
Bureau to contract with instream groups for the sale of water
rights to protect instream values; and
2) Amending the California Water Code to encourage the
Bureau to create a specific policy allowing irrigation districts
to transfer Bureau developed water to instream groups.
F. Encourage conservation and facilitate reallocation of inefficiently used water by:
1) Amending the California Water Code to place the right to
salvaged water in the hands of the salvager; and
2) Amending the California Water Code § 1010 to include a)
exempting salvaged water from unreasonable use and forfeiture claims, and b) declaring that such water may be sold,
leased, exchanged or transferred.
This proposal for market-based reallocation should be supported by both instream groups and current appropriators. First,
market-based reallocation provides benefits and options to instream groups which are not available under the current system.
Rather than being merely considered by the Board, instream values protected by instream flow rights will receive the same presumptions of reasonableness and status as other uses secured by
appropriative rights. Rather than having to compete on a reactive basis20 3 through post hoc terms and conditions or reserved
jurisdiction, instream values can be protected prospectively by
purchases before harm has occurred. In fact, the purchase of instream flows could provide instream groups with a mechanism
for protecting instream values almost totally independent of
Board interference. This gives instream groups the ability to mitigate the damage resulting from a Board which allows diversionary water demands to prosper at the expense of water needed to
maintain the health of a stream. Moreover, market-based reallo203. FINAL

REPORT, supra note

2, at 110-12.
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cation gives instream groups the opportunity to augment instream flows beyond what is considered minimally necessary to
maintain instream values.
Second, market-based reallocation does not negatively affect
current appropriators as do current systems of instream flow protection. Unlike the public trust doctrine, or reserved jurisdiction,
market-based reallocation is both voluntary and compensatory
for reallocated rights. Furthermore, market-based reallocation
does not inject uncertainty into the framework of the appropriative rights doctrine as do other means of coerced and retroactive
reallocation.
Finally, market-based reallocation does not suffer from the
same institutional and economic inefficiencies as do the current
20 4
mechanisms. Unlike litigation with its winner-loser dichotomy
and uncertain outcomes, market-based reallocation promotes
mutual benefits and creates a direct correlation between resources spent and gains received. Market-based reallocation further avoids the consequences of adversarial positional
bargaining 20 5 and unwise administrators 20 6 by placing reallocation in the direct control of the parties and not the courts or the
Board. Moreover, market-based reallocation accounts for opportunity costs 20 7 and does not place an unrealistic infinite value on
20 8
instream flows.
204. J. BAGLEY, supra note 106, at 53.
205. Illustrative of the contentious nature of water allocation controversies is the
long-standing feud between Sacramento County and the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) over the EBMUD's entitlement to 150,000 af/y of American River water.
Seventeen years of litigation and a Board reference have been unable to fashion a compromise or even resolve the issues of the EBMUD's diversions. American River Policy
Keying to Conservation, Sacramento Bee, Feb. 6, 1988, at BI, col. 2.
206. The court's lack of knowledge and understanding of complex water issues is
self-admitted in its deferral of such cases to the SWRCB. The Board itself was in part
created to overcome the unwise administrator problem. Unfortunately, hearings that
take place before county water boards may lack the experience in dealing with instream
values imputed to the SWRCB. In fact, there is some question, from interested parties,
about the actual expertise of the politically appointed SWRCB. Letter from David R.
Schuster, General Manager of State Water Contractors to State Water Contractors
Member Agencies (Nov. 10, 1988) (copy on file with the Stanford Environmental Law
Society).
207. J. BAGLEY, supra note 106, at 54.
208. Id. at 54-55.
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WATER MARKETING AND INSTREAM FLOWS
INTEGRATING THE PURCHASE OF INSTREAM FLOWS WITH
CALIFORNIA'S WATER LAW AND MANAGEMENT

The purchase of diverted water and its reallocation to protect
instream values may be possible, to some extent, under current
law. However, groups wishing to purchase instream flows to protect instream values will face a number of legal, institutional, and
practical factors which must be considered before these groups
can expected to invest their resources in such purchases. This
section explains potential obstacles and discusses how the above
proposed statutory reforms within the context of California's
new direction in water management will overcome these obstacles and
facilitate the sale of diverted water to augment instream
20 9
flows.

A.

Legal ConsiderationsFacing Instream Groups Wishing lo Purchase
Waterfor the Protection of Instream Values
1. The diversion requirement and instreamflow reallocation.

Instream flow groups will initially be concerned about
whether the Board will approve a change in use petition where
the proposed change moves water from a diversionary use to an
instream use. In denying an instream group an appropriative
water right for instream flows, the California court held in California Trout v. State Water Resources Control Board and Fullerton v. State
Water Resources Control Board that an appropriative right cannot be
established unless there is some form of diversion or physical
control. 210 This holding could prevent market-based reallocation
209. The nature of the obstacles which impede a transfer of water from diversionary to instream uses largely depends on who presently holds the right to the water and
who is putting it to a beneficial use. There are five general types of institutions and
individuals that are potential suppliers of marketable water.
1) An individual who possesses an appropriative right and is solely responsible for
diverting, conveying, and putting water to a beneficial use.
2) An individual who possesses an appropriative right, but relies on another entity,
generally either a water district, the Bureau, or the DWR. to impound or convey the
water.

3) An individual beneficial user who possesses contracts from the Bureau or a water
district.
4) Federal or state water development agencies, which in California are the Bureau
and the DWR.
5) Over 1,000 water districts or agencies that often possess their own water rights or
contract for water from the Bureau or the DWR.
210. California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd.. 90 Cal. App. 3d
816, 819, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672, 674 (1979); Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control
Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 593, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 520 (1979).
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because when an appropriative right holder attempted to transfer
his right to an instream group, the Board could simply refuse to
approve the proposed change of use on the grounds that there is
no diversion of the water.
The purchase of currently diverted water for instream value
protection is, in several important respects, distinguishable from
applying for a permit to appropriate unallocated water. Thus, it
is by no means certain that a court or the Board will interpret the
holdings in California Trout and Fullerton to block the reallocation
of water purchased to enhance instream values.
For example, the CaliforniaTrout court based its argument that
a diversion is required on provisions in the California Water
Code that specify the information required for the establishment
of a new appropriative water right. 21 I By contrast, sections of the
Water Code that require Board approval of changes in water use
do not specifically require descriptions of diversion works.2 1 2
Moreover, because of the tenuous grounds upon which the court
denied the right to appropriate instream flows in California Trout
and Fullerton, there is much doubt that a court would use the diversion requirement to prevent 3the reallocation of an appropria21
tive right to an instream flow.
Additionally, the Fullerton court argued that instream appropriative rights would preclude any other beneficial uses of water
211. California Trout, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (citing CAL.
1260).
212. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1700-1706 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990).
213. The California Trout and Fullerton courts were unable to rest their holdings on
any Constitutional or Water Code provisions requiring that a diversion or physical control must occur in order to acquire an appropriative right. Rather, the Fullerton court's
holdings were based on: (1) California Water Code § 1260, which requires the appropriator to describe the works to be constructed for obtaining the water and the proposed
place of diversion. CAL. WATER CODE § 1260 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990); Fullerton, 90
Cal. App. 3d at 600, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 525. (2) The court's deferral to the SWRCB's
long-standing policy of requiring physical control and possession. Id. at 601, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 526. (3) The fact that no prior court had found an appropriative right for an
instream flow. Id. at 603, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
The court's reasoning is flawed because: (1) The purpose of California Water Code
§ 1260 is to describe the physical characteristics of the permit. In determining that a
diversion is a component of an appropriative right, the court begs the question that a
diversion is necessary. (2) The California courts have historically held that a diversion is
not necessary for a valid appropriative right in California. Lilly, supra note 10, at 718.
(3) The SWRCB has no valid long-standing requirement of diversion. Id. at 719. (4)
The court had never granted an appropriative right for instream value protection because it had never before been squarely faced with such a question.
WATER CODE §
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and would "tie the Board's hands as to future uses.112t" These
arguments do not not apply to reallocated instream flows. 2 15
The historical rationales for the diversion requirement are also
not applicable when dealing with a reallocation of an appropriative right. 21 6 Finally, statutory provisions have been adopted
since Fullertonwhich allow market-based reallocation of water
for
21 7
circumstances.
certain
in
values
instream
of
the protection
Despite these differences between instream appropriation and
the purchase of water for instream flows, a court nevertheless
might hold that instream flow reallocations are invalid. To prevent this outcome, the Legislature could overturn California Trout
and Fullerton by enacting legislation to amend the California
Water Code to expressly state a diversion is not required for the
appropriation of instream flows. However, enacting such legislation would be difficult because the politically powerful agricultural and municipal water interests will fear that instream groups
might then appropriate all the remaining unappropriated water
in the state. 218 Therefore, the Legislature should simply amend
the Water Code so that the reallocation of an appropriative right
to an instream flow will not be subject to a diversion
214. Fullerton, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 604, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
215. Essentially, the court feared that instream groups would appropriate all the
unappropriated water remaining in California. This practical argument, however, is not
applicable to instream transfers because they are transfers of currently appropriated
water, which is already locked up.
216. These rationales are: (1) to prevent speculation, (2) to assure the watcr is
being used, (3) to measure the use of the water to determine the quantity of the right,
(4) to prove validity of intent to appropriate, and (5) to give notice to other water users.
Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of hutrram Uses, 1986 U.
ILL. L. REv. 407, 420 (1986). The limits on speculation are discussed below. Ste infra
note 315. Without requiring a diversion, instream transfer meets the needs of the remaining rationale. The protection of instream values is a statutorily declared beneficial
use. CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West Supp. 1990). The quantity of water within the
instream right will have already been measured by the prior appropriator who sold the
right to the instream group. The act of filing a permit to transfer manifests proof of
intent, provides notice, thereby essentially making the physical diversion requirement
obsolete. Ausness, supra, at 420.
217. Under the California Fish and Game Code (amended after the Califomia Trout
and Fullerton decisions), the California Department of Fish and Game has the right to
purchase water and water rights for the protection of threatened or endangered species
or for the purpose of recreation, conservation, and propagation and utilization of fish
and game resources. However, the authority to make purchases is limited. Statutes only
authorize the purchase of instream flows as one component of large preservation
projects. There is no authority to purchase flows simply to protect the health of a
stream. CAL. FIsH & GArE CODE §§ 1301, 1348 (West 1984).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 75-85 for a discussion of an instream appropriation proposal.
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2 19

2. SWRCB review of water right transfers and instreamflow
reallocation.
As discussed above, when the owner of an appropriative water
right wishes to change the point of diversion, place of use, or
purpose of use from that which is specified in the current water
right, she must apply for a permit for this variance from the
SWRCB.2 2 ° In considering a petition for transfer, the Board applies the no-injury standard, which requires that a transferred use
causes no harm to another legal user.22 ' Securing Board approval for a proposed change has been found to be both burden222
some and time-consuming.
Unlike other changes of use, changes effected to increase instream flows will generally provide benefits for other appropriators. For example, water quality is often improved through
pollution dilution 223 and salinity repulsion. Moreover, unlike
other types of transfers, instream flow reallocation does not reduce the amount of return flow available to downstream appropriators. Such transfers to instream uses should thus be subject
to a less rigorous administrative review.
In order to expedite the reallocation of diverted water to instream flows, the Legislature should amend the permit process
for changes in use which augment instream flows. Such changes
in use should occur thirty days after the Board is notified, unless
the Board has sufficient cause to believe the transfer is not in the
public interest, or a junior appropriator might be significantly
harmed by the transfer. Furthermore, the Legislature should
adopt the Governor's Commission recommendation to change
219. Arguably, California has already taken steps in this direction. See CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 1301, 1348 (West Supp. 1990). This legislation is in line with ten other western states that have enacted legislation which in some way circumvents or abolishes the
diversion requirement in order to protect instream values. N.Johnson, The Doctrine of
Prior Appropriation and the Changing West 14-19 (1987) (unpublished staff report of
the Western States Water Council) (copy on file with the Stanford Environmental Law
Society).
220. CAL. WATER CODE § 1700-1701 (West 1971 & Supp. 1990).
221. Some commentators argue that the no-injury rule provides "security to users
of return flow" and requires "senior appropriators to consider the value of uses made by
junior appropriators." O'Brien, supra note 167, at 1171.
222. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 69.
223. Colby, The Economic Value of Instream Flows-Can Insiream Values Compete in the
Market for Water Rights?, in INSTREAm FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST 89-90 (1989).
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the no-injury standard to a less burdensome no substantial injury
standard.2 24
B. InstitutionalConsiderationsFacing Instream Groups Wishing to
Purchase Waterfor the Protection of Instream Values
1. Irrigationdistrict control of water resources and instreamflow
reallocation.
California has over 1,000 public water districts22' 5 which develop and hold rights to about one third of the water for the
state's urban and agricultural uses.226 Because irrigation districts
possess significant water rights, own and operate impoundment
and diversion facilities, and transfer Bureau and State Water
Project 227 (SWP) water to irrigators, instream groups will likely
need to purchase water from such districts. Because their powers
are limited by statute, water districts often play a limited role in
water marketing transactions. Moreover, complex water allocation and pricing policies established by water districts often discourage conservation.
224. The Governor's Commission recommendation is based on the fact that the
no-injury rule can be used to block transfers which result in a significant benefit to the
public interest, but which cause slight harm to a junior appropriator. FINA. RE.PoRT,
supra note 2, at 102.
225. C. PHELPS, N. MOORE & M. GRAUBARD, EFFICIENT WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA:
WATER RIGHTS, WATER DISTRICTS, AND WATER TRANSFERS 8 (1978) (Rand Corporation

Report R-2386-CSA/RF) [hereinafter Rand Report].
Water districts have been created either by general water district acts or by special
acts of the Legislature. These enabling acts authorize the water district to provide a
variety of services designed to facilitate the use and control of water resources. Id
The function of a water district is to provide water to the actual users within the
district's geographical boundaries. Water districts accomplish this task by purchasing
water from wholesalers such as the State Water Project or the Bureau of Reclamation or
by developing their own water supply, which they then sell or otherwise supply to their
-members. Id. at 7. Water districts usually are divided into municipal districts, which
supply urban needs, and irrigation districts, which supply agricultural needs.
For a further discussion of water districts, see generally CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN 155, GENERAL COMPARISON OF CALIFORNIA WATER DsSTuc'r AcTs
(1965) (Department of Water Resources); and C. HOBBS, TIE WATER DisTmCTS OF CALIFORNIA (Association of California Water Agencies Report, 1979).
226. DWR BULLETIN 160-87, supra note 150, at 23. Local water agency development accounts for 10 million aE/yr of water in California.
227. The SWP is the state equivalent of the Bureau of Reclamation. It is the
agency responsible for state subsidized development and distribution of water resources. The SWP develops about 2.4 million af/yr (77o) of water for agricultural and
urban use. DWR BULLETIN 160-87, supra note 150, at 40. The SWP is not discussed as a
possible candidate for instream flow reallocation because it currently only develops
about 507o of the water which it is contractually obligated to supply to users. Id.
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Limited authority to sell water. The sole purpose of irrigation districts is to develop water for their members, 2 28 not to satisfy
water needs outside of the community at large. Irrigation districts are thus statutorily prohibited from selling their water
rights, 2 29 although recent legislation allows irrigation districts to
lease or contract water, which they determine to be surplus
water, to uses.outside the district. 23 0 In addition, the law limits
the ability of individual irrigators who receive water from local
23
districts to transfer water to uses outside of the district. '
Lack of clear ownership of water rights and entitlements, 3 2 as
well as the requirement of district approval for water transfers
made by an individual member of the water district, 23 additionally complicate the reallocation of water controlled by the irrigation district. Because they own and operate the facilities which
impound and store water, irrigation districts have legal title to
the water; it is the individual irrigators, however, who perfect the

C.

228. As one commentator has observed:
The ultimate purpose of a district organized under the Irrigation Act ... is the
improvement, by irrigation,of the lands within the district. It can, under law, be organized and exist and acquire property only for such purpose... It has to do solely
with the irrigation of lands within the district, and cannot appropriate water for
any other purpose.
MEYERS & R. POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS: TOWARD AN IMPROVED

MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES Al-21 (National Water Commission Legal Study No. 4,

1971) (citingJenison v. Redfield, 149 Cal. 500, 503, 87 P. 62, 64 (1906)) (emphasis in
original). This mandate was later expanded to include domestic purposes within the
district.
229. The California Water Code states "[n]othing in this article [§§ 22250-22264]
authorizes the sale of any water right." CAL. WATER CODE § 22261 (West 1984).

230. The California Water Code authorizes a local water agency to transfer any
water which it holds by virtue of appropriative rights and which it deems as surplus to
the district's needs. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 382-383 (West Supp. 1990). The district may
enter into an agreement with its members to market water to which members are entitled but which they do not wish to use. CAL. WATER CODE § 383(c) (West Supp, 1990).
Any such transaction that lasts for more than three years will likely need to be approved
by the State Treasurer's Commission. CAL. WATER CODE § 22260 (West 1984). The

California Water Code also contains provisions which allow a right holder the option to
request water districts to act as her agent in marketing surplus water. CAL. WATER CODE
§ 383(c) (West Supp. 1990).
231. Any assignment of an entitlement to water use by a landowner must be applied within the district. CAL. WATER CODE § 22251 (West 1984).

232. The scope of an irrigator's water entitlement is often uncertain. Roos-Collins, t'oluntary Conveyance of the Right to Receive a Water Supply from the United States Bureau of
Reclamation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 773, 847 (1987).

233. NAT'L. CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REALLOCATING WESTERN WATER: EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION 10 [hereinafter REALLOCATING WESTERN WATER].
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appropriative right by putting the water to a beneficial use. 2 3 4 It
is thus not clear which entity has the right to transfer the water to
an instream group.
In order to facilitate the reallocation of surplus agricultural
water to instream flows, the Legislature should amend the California Water Code to allow irrigation districts to contract directly
with instream groups, and to allow individual irrigators to trans-

fer water to instream groups outside the district..2 35 The Legislature should also change the California Water Code so that
irrigation districts can sell actual water rights to instream groups.
Furthermore, the Legislature or the SWRCB should assign title
to water supplied by the district to the individual irrigators or
allow irrigators the right to transfer their option to instream
groups without district approval.23 6
Minimal economic incentives to transferwater. Under current law,
neither the irrigation district, nor the individual irrigator may
profit from the sale of irrigation district water. - 7 Without profit,
there is simply no incentive to conserve water and voluntarily reallocate it to instream groups. - 8 Even if profit were allowed, because there is often no formal or effective means for distributing
it, there would still be no incentive to conserve water for such
reallocation.23 9
234. Roos-Collins, supra note 232, at 847-48.
235. Allowing instream groups the right to contract directly with the irrigation districts for water to protect instream values is a blanket solution to the factors inhibiting
instream reallocation created by the statutory prohibitions on irrigation districts. By
keeping the water and the mechanisms of the transfer within the existing system, such a
solution eliminates the problems associated with transferring water out of the irrigation
district allocations.
236. See Rand Report, supra note 225, at 36.
237. The California Water Code provides that the valuation of any appropriative
right may not be "in excess of the actual amount paid to the State" for the permit or
license. CAL. WATER CODE § 1392 (West 1971). In addition, the irrigation districts
themselves, by virtue of their standing as a public agency, cannot profit. Rand Report,
supra note 225, at viii.
The fact that irrigation districts and individuals cannot profit from the sale of the
water right may prove to be only a shadow barrier "[t]here exists no reported judicial
consideration of these two sections of the Water Code. In practice, their restrictions on
sale and condemnation prices have not been enforced." C. MEYRS & A. TARLocK.
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT-r A COURSEBOOK IN Lw AND Punuc Pouc' 637 (2d ed.

1980). If this is indeed true, then there should be little hesitation on the part of the
Legislature to lift this shadow barrier and officially allow irrigation districts and individuals the right to profit.
238. Rand Report, supra note 225, at 29-31.
239. Id. at 32.

178

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 9:132

Moreover, irrigators often may only contract with the irrigation district for an option on a quantity of water; they receive no
water rights, and the water which they do not use remains under
the control of the irrigation district. 240 Because any unused portion of the option reverts back to the control of the irrigation
district, there is no incentive for the irrigator to use water more
efficiently. 2 4 '

Finally, prices for water do not reflect the cost of supplying
water or its scarcity value, nor do they reflect changes in cost or
demand.242 For example, pricing policies value water at the average cost of supply, and not the real marginal cost, thus irrigators
"take more water than the real social value of water would warrant. ' ' 243 Such flat rate pricing policies encourage inefficient
water use, discourage conservation, and create a disincentive to
generate surplus water.244 These pricing policies thus unfortunately inhibit the transfer of water, even though such transfers
240. Id. at 30. Each farmer is entitled to an option to receive water based on the
amount of land he owns.
241. For example:
A farmer deciding to reduce his water use saves the marginal water toll,
but gets nothing for the value of this "option" to obtain water from the district.
This option may be a small part, but in some cases is the entire cost of water to
the farmer. In the latter case, the farmer gets nothing in return for his decision
to use less water.
Id. at 31.
242. G. WEATHERFORD, WATER AND AGRICULTURE IN THE WESTERN U.S.: CONSERVATION, REALLOCATION, AND MARKETS 25 (1982).
243. Id.
244. Districts generally charge flat rates to all district members, whether they use
water or not. This policy provides security to the bondholders underwriting the construction of a district's conveyance facilities, but often leaves districts with surplus financial and water resources. Because districts may not profit and risk losing their water
right if the water is unused, they must put it to use without earning a profit. The artificially low prices created by this policy eliminates any elasticity of demand or incentive to
conserve. Moreover, such pricing policies often affect water which is subsidized by the
state and federal government. See D. Gardner, Pricing and Efficient Allocation of Irrigation Water in California (December 28, 1982) (paper presented to the Society of Government Economists, Allied Social Science Associations Annual Meeting, New York,
N.Y.). For a discussion of price elasticities for water, see Howwitt, A Re-evaluation of Price
Elasticitiesfor Irrigation Water, 16 WATER RESOURCES RES. 623 (Aug. 1980).
Perhaps the largest scale on which this pricing subsidy occurs is the SWP. The
Metropolitan Water District (MWD) has never used its full water entitlement. Its unclaimed water is generally sold to irrigation districts. Because the MWD is still required
to pay for its water entitlement, the Department of Water Resources only charges conveyance costs for the surplus water it sells. Hence, the MWD pays more for water that it
does not use than water districts, such as the Kern County Water Agency, pay for the
water they do use. M. STORPER & R. WALKER, THE PRICE OF WATER: SURPLUS AND SUBSIDY IN THE STATE WATER PROJECT 21-29 (1984).
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would not affect the quality or quantity of an irrigator's crops.245
In order to provide an incentive for irrigation districts to conserve water and make it available for transfer to instream groups,
the Legislature should amend the California Water Code to permit a reasonable return on water sold to instream groups. In addition, irrigators must have an assignable right to the unused
portion of their option.246 This would also solve the dilemma of
distribution of the profit achieved from conservation. Although
there is currently no feasible legislative means of dealing with flat
rate pricing policies, as the federal government reduces its subsidies and becomes more determined to recover its capital costs,
the marginal utility of using water for the sake of maintaining the
right will surely decrease, thus encouraging conservation and
reallocation.
Historically, irrigation districts have been largely insulated
from external political pressures.24 7 Because of their unique status as quasi-public agencies and their significant political power,
they have been able to shield themselves from external legislative
or political pressure.248 However, pressure to take part in market-based reallocation is beginning to come from several sources.
Recently, Congress and the Legislature have begun to encourage
market-based reallocation by requiring increased efficiency of agricultural water use.2 4 9 Presumably the individual recipients of
district water, especially those who have reduced consumption
but must continue to pay flat rates, will pressure the districts to
sell water and use the proceeds to reduce fees and retire district
debt. The Legislature should thus enact the above suggested
changes so that when districts choose to do so, they will be able
245. G. WEATHERFORD, supra note 242, at 215.
246. Roos-Collins, supra note 232, at 843.
247. See generally Comment, Desert Surviva" The Evolving Western Irrigation District.
1982 ARIz. ST. LJ. 377 (1982); De Young, Governing Special Districts: The Conflict Between
Voting Rights and Property Privileges, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 419 (1982); Leshy, Irrigation Districts in a Changing Vest-An Overview, 1982 ARz. ST. L.J. 345 (1982).
248. As quasi-public agencies, irrigation districts have the power to levy taxes. yet
are not specifically accountable to any supervising agency or administrator.
249. Pressure from the legislature has taken two forms. Ste CAt. WATER CODE
§§ 375-377 (West Supp. 1990), which require public entities supplying water to adopt
and enforce a water conservation program; CAL. WATER CODE § 109(a) (West Supp.
1990), which declares that it is the policy of the state to require efficient use of water, see
also 43 U.S.C. § 390jj (1982), requiring conservation programs for non-federal recipient
of Bureau water, AB 1658, Ch. 954, Agricultural Water Management Planning, Statutes
1989; Comment, The ReclamationReform Act of 1982: Reform or Replacement? 45 U. Prrr. L
REV. 647 (1984).
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to more easily transfer water resources to instream groups.
2.

25

Bureau of Reclamation control of water resources and instream
flow reallocation.

The Bureau of Reclamation's participation in market-based
reallocation is important because the Bureau currently controls
25
approximately twenty-four percent of the water in California '
and operates eighty percent of California's agricultural storage
and conveyance facilities.2 5 2 The Bureau was created by Congress in 1902 solely to develop water for irrigation in the West.
Since then, Congress has expanded the Bureau's mandate considerably, provided the Bureau with considerable discretion, and
placed few restrictions on the transfer of water held by Bureau
beneficiaries.2 5 3 Instream groups wishing to purchase Bureaudeveloped water may either seek to purchase water directly from
the Bureau's currently unallocated yield or indirectly from irrigation districts who have contracts with the Bureau.
State legal control over Bureau contracting is limited. Thus
federal reclamation law and the Bureau's administrative willingness will dictate whether instream groups will be able to effectively purchase instream flow entitlements from the Bureau.
Vague statutory authority to transfer water. The Bureau's mandate
to promote irrigation of the arid west might restrict the Bureau's
ability to contract directly with instream groups. Despite a lack of
specific authority to contract for instream flow protection, the
250. For evidence of irrigation district desire to cooperate in the protection of instream values, see supra note 197 and accompanying text (Nature Conservancy purchase
of water from Upper Snake Water Bank where an irrigation district donated 10,000 af to
augment instream flows).
251. DWR BULLETIN 160-87, supra note 150, at 40. Bureau development accounts
for 8.3 million af/yr of water in California. Id. at 23.

252.

REALLOCATING WESTERN WATER,

supra note 233, at 12-13. For a thorough

discussion of the role of the Bureau in western water development, see B.

ANDREWS &
M. SANSONE, WHO RUNS THE RIVERS? DAMS AND DECISIONS IN THE NEW WEST 167-214

(1983).
253. In 1902, the Bureau was originally mandated to "encourage homesteader settlement and irrigation of publicly owned desert." Roos-Collins, supra note 232, at 788.
The provision of water for agriculture is an explicit Congressional mandate that takes
precedence over any conflicting state laws or policies, and thus state action cannot reduce or infringe upon the quantity of water that the Bureau has contracted to supply its
irrigation customers. Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCraken, 357 U.S. 275, 290-94
(1958). Thus only "surplus" water controlled by the Bureau, and water which is "freed
up" because of conservation by irrigation districts, is available for transfer.
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Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934 (Preservation Act)2 "
and the Water Project Recreation Act of 1965 (Recreation Act)2 "
authorize the Bureau to consider fish and wildlife values when
planning and operating water development projects.
Only one court has ruled on whether the Recreation Act allows an entitlement holder to use water solely for recreational
use.2 5 6 Basing its decision on the specific statute authorizing the
San Juan-Chama project, the court rejected the use of water
solely for fish, wildlife, and recreational purposes. However, the
court did not find that reclamation law would generally prohibit
the use of Bureau water solely for environmental protection or
recreation. 5 7
As for Bureau permission to transfer Bureau water held by
irrigation districts to instream groups, neither the Federal Redamation law nor regulations of the Bureau explicitly restrict the
conveyance of project rights from irrigators to third parties after
the water entitlement has passed to the irrigator. - 8 In fact, almost no official policy exists as to whether the Bureau may or
may not permit such transfers.25 9
Unclearadministrative willingness to transferwater. In order to facilitate its transition to an effective resource management organization, the Bureau has discussed the need to work with "[n]ew
254. 16 U.S.C. § 661 (1988). The Preservation Act requires the construction of
water impoundment facilities "with a view to the conservation of wildlife resources." 16
U.S.C. § 662(a) (1988). The Act also mandates that "wildlife conservation shall receive
equal consideration ... with other features of water- resource development." 16 U.S.C.
§ 661 (1988).
255. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-13, 18(b) (1988). In the Recreation Act, Congress sought to
increase the role of local and state public bodies in establishing, maintaining, and operating federal water projects in ways that protect or enhance fish, wildlife, and recreational water uses. Ia In addition, the Recreation Act establishes federal cost-sharing
programs for the modification of water projects in order to protect and enhance instream values. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-13 (1988).
256. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. City of Albuquerque, 657 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir.
1981).
257. Id Injicariea, the city argued that the Recreation Act provides authority to
store water solely for recreational uses. The court held that an impoundment solely for
recreational uses was inconsistent with federal law. However, the court was dear to base
its holding on the specific statute authorizing the impoundment. Id. at 1136-1137.
Thus, there appears to be no specific Congressional mandate which prevents the use of
Bureau water solely for the protection and enhancement of fish. wildlife, and recreational water uses.
258. Roos-Collins, supra note 232, at 788, 848, 849.
259. AsSESSMEN- '87, supra note 162, at 5.
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constituencies in potential partner arrangements. ' 260 In redefining its mission, and recognizing the need to work with new constituencies, the Bureau has made "water quality - environmental
restoration and enhancement" its top priority for 1998 after operation and maintenance of facilities. 261 To achieve these new
goals, the Bureau is developing a revised water marketing policy
addressing the viability of marketing or renting marginal
water.2 6 2
Traditionally, there has been little incentive for irrigation districts to attempt to transfer Bureau water to other uses. Transfers are not actively encouraged because neither federal statutes
nor Bureau guidelines sanction transfers or allow irrigation districts to profit from the transfer of Bureau water. Nevertheless,
Federal Reclamation law precludes neither the sale of Bureaudeveloped water by project recipients nor profit from such
sales. 2 3 Thus, whether or not to allow profit is a policy decision
left to the discretion of the Bureau. 2 4 Recently, the Bureau declared an intention to permit subleasing of water for profit. 2 65
The transfer of Bureau-developed water has also been inhibited because "[any potential conveyance of a project right is currently burdened by the necessity of untangling the 'Gordian
knot' 2 66 of the relationship between the Bureau, a contracting
district, and irrigators. ' 2 67 The solution lies in one of two areas:
260. Id. at 4.
261. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
A NEW DIRECTION OF THE BUREAU

BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

OF RECLAMATION 3 (1987). Water quality ranks
second of 13 priorities for the next decade.

262. ASSESSMENT '87, supra note 162, at ii. This report also lists water marketing as
one of seven policy areas it will address itself to as part of this transition to effective
resource management. Id. at 4-5.
263. See REALLOCATING WESTERN WATER, supra note 233, at 12 (citing Voluntay
Transfers of FederallySupplied Water: Experiences of the Bureau of Reclamation, in WATER MARKETING: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF A NEW ERA (S. Shupe ed. 1986)).
264. Roos-Collins, supra note 232, at 845-46. The Bureau's main concern in any
transaction is that it be compensated for the proportional cost of the project that creates
and conveys the water to the irrigation district. Id. at 817-18.
265. ASSESSMENT '87, supra note 162, at 5.
266. Gordius was a mythological founder of Phrygia, who tied an intricate knot in a
chariot thong, the untying of which was pronounced by oracle to be possible only to the
one destined to be king of Asia.
267. Roos-Collins, supra note 232, at 822 (citation omitted). By virtue of its ownership of the project facilities and appropriative permits, the Bureau holds the water right.
Id. at 828. However, the Reclamation Act fails to define the nature of the rights held by
the irrigation districts or the irrigator, nor is there an administrative policy that provides
guidelines for such a definition. Id. at 822.
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either an independent unravelling of the 'Gordian knot' to ascertain just what proprietary rights are controlled by the Bureau,
irrigation district, and irrigators,2 "8 or a willingness on the part of
the Bureau to identify and facilitate the alienation of the rights
held by the irrigation interests.269 In response to this problem,
the Bureau is reviewing its restrictions on ownership and alienation of projects and, presumably, project water.
In addition to its own internal review, the Bureau is coming
under pressure to improve its protection of instream values. In a
Predecision Referral Statement concerning Draft Environmental
Impact Statements (DEISs) for the proposed renewal of longterm water contracts for Orange Cove and other Friant Dam unit
irrigation districts of the Central Valley Project, the Acting Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) criticized the Bureau for failing "to consider water quality impacts of
long-term renewal without measures to adjust terms and conditions to control water quantity and quality to maintain and restore in-stream beneficial uses.1 270 The EPA further believes
that, "[t]he EIS should evaluate the feasibility of restoring fish
and wildlife habitat below Friant Dam as one of the alternative
27
uses for Friant Unit water." '
268. Such a task has been undertaken by Richard Roos-Collins. His work Voluntary
Conveyance of Water Project Rights, supra note 232, serves as a useful starting point for
determining what proprietary interests can be conveyed.
269. In 1973 the National Water Commission recommended that federal legislation should declare that the rights held by the irrigation districts and the irrigators are
rights to the amount of water they are entitled to use, and are freely transferable. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 264-69.
270. Predecision Referral Statement (40 CFR 1504.3(c)(2)) Supporting the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's Referral to the Council on Environmental Quality of
the U.S. Department of the Interior's Proposed Renewal of Water Contracts for the
Friant Unit of the Central Valley Project (attached to letter fromJohn A. Moore, Acting
Administrator, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, to A. Alan Hill, Chairman,
Council on Environmental Quality (Feb. 2, 1989)) (copy on file with the Stanford Environmental Law Society).
271. Issues to be Considered in a Friant Unit Supplemental EIS 1 (attached to
letter from Deanna M. Weiman, Director, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Region IX Office of External Affairs, to David G. Houston, Regional Director, Bureau of
Reclamation, Mid-Pacific Region (Jan. 1989)) (copy on file with the Stanford Environmental Law Society). The EPA further commented:
To significantly aid fish and wildlife, it may be necessary to allocate (dedicate)
flows specifically for that use. We commend the Bureau's recent decision to
release "emergency" water out of New Melones Dam to enhance habitat, but
this is likely a one-time event to alleviate drought conditions. Routine releases
may be needed to realize beneficial uses.
Id at 1-2.
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In a second letter concerning the proposed allocation of 1.5
million af of 'unallocated yield' from the Central Valley Project,
the Bureau's decision is criticized for failing to comply with a
number of substantive environmental statutes 272 and procedural
requirements in the Bureau's Draft Environmental Impact Statement.273 The Bureau recalled its DEIS, which arguably represents a willingness to effect modifications that satisfy the EPA's
criticisms; however, it is unclear whether the Bureau will include
the water reallocation analysis recommended by the EPA.274
The Bureau's broadening environmental mandate and apparent authority to sell some of its water to protect and enhance
instream values should encourage such sales. Moreover, instream flow sales would also help the Bureau achieve several of
its recently enunciated objectives. These goals include: achieving
greater environmental protection while operating facilities within
current fiscal objectives, reducing EPA disfavor with its operations, and broadening its present constituency. 27 - This may include environmental groups and urban recreational water users.
The Bureau itself could encourage instream flow purchases
by developing innovative purchase options that allow it to meet
its operating costs while making additional flows available to instream flow groups. The Bureau might also facilitate transactions between entitlement holders and instream flow groups.
Finally, the Bureau could commit staff resources to locate areas
where marginal increases in flows would provide substantial instream flow benefits and then push to see that the appropriate
sales take place.
The California Legislature has no control over the Bureau
and can do little more than create mechanisms and administra272. McGovern Letter, supra note 5, at 5-6.
273. Attachment to McGovern Letter, supra note 5, at 2. The EPA does not limit
itself to criticizing the DEIS's failure to take environmental laws and agreements into
consideration. The EPA urges the Bureau to reevaluate its pricing and contract policies,
analyze the prospect for changes in subsidy and cropping patterns, and address the feasibility of reducing water demand through increased conservation. Id. at 3-5.
274. Given recent mandates in federal reclamation law and the Bureau's intention
to expand its mandate, the Bureau may well include such analysis. If enacted, conservation policies and price increases may result in the "creation" of a large quantity of reallocatable water. To comply with federal regulations, some of the 1.5 million af must go
to instream uses. Yet there is a real possibility that this quantity of water could be increased if instream flow groups are allowed to make purchases directly from the Bureau.
275. AsSESSMENT'87, supra note 162, at 4; see also REPORT TO CONGRESS BY TlE U.S.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, CHANGES IN FEDERAL WATER PROJECT REPAYMENT POLICIES CAN
REDUCE FEDERAL COSTS (CED-81-77 1977) [hereinafter REDUCING FEDERAL COSTS],

1990]

WATER MARKETING AND INSTREAM FLOWS

185

tive procedures to expedite water transfers approved by the Bureau. However, the Legislature could amend the Water Code to
authorize private instream flow groups to contract with the Bureau directly for instream flows 276 and to encourage the Bureau
to create a specific policy allowing irrigation districts to transfer
Bureau developed water to instream groups.
C.

PracticalConsiderations: Can a Market be Establishedfor
Instream Flows.
Reallocating instream flows from current uses requires both a
willing seller who possesses surplus water and a buyer with the
resources necessary to purchase this water. 77 This section discusses changing trends which may create incentives for current
right holders to conserve and transfer water. It then addresses
the financial capability of instream groups to purchase instream
flows.
1.

Current lack of incentives to conserve and reallocate water to
instreamflows?

Although much agricultural water in California is used inefficiently,27 8 and current appropriators appear willing to sell
276. Such legislation might expand upon a 1986 statute requiring the DWR to do
the following[P]ursue discussions with the [Bureau] to permit persons and public entities
which have entitlements to water from the federal Central Valley Project, to
enter into legally binding contracts with any public entity which supplies water
for domestic use, irrigation use, or environmental protection in this state for
the transfer of federal water entitlements during times of shortage.
CAL. WATER CODE § 10009 (West Supp. 1990).
This statute specifically addresses the purchase of water from Bureau entitlement
holders, not the Bureau itself. However, it was enacted when the Bureau was in the
midst of an indefinite, self-imposed moratorium on further contracting of water. Now
that the Bureau is seeking to end this moratorium, there is little reason to assume that
the Legislature would be unwilling to expand this statute to include the purchase of the
"surplus" water.
277. The most likely sellers will be agricultural users, who control over 907 of
applied water use in California. Of the total 40,450.000 af of applied water in California
in 1985, agriculture interests used 32,911,000 af (81 7), urban interests used 6,573,000
af (16%), wildlife and recreation interests used 927,000 af (2%o), and energy production
used 39,000 af (.01%7). DWR BuLLEIN 160-87, STATISTICAL APPENDIX, supra note 46, at
7.
278. The California Water Code contains a legislative finding that "[s]ignificant
opportunities exist in some areas, through improved irrigation water management, to
conserve water." CAL. WATER CODE § 10801(h) (West Supp. 1990). For example, a
study done by the California Department of Water Resources found that the Imperial
Irrigation District could conserve up to 437,000 af per year by reducing inefficient use.
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water,'2 79 historically there has been little incentive to con-

serve, 2 80 as much of the water used for California's irrigated agri8

culture is heavily subsidized by the federal government.2 I
Federal and state water development projects have ensured irri-

gators plentiful quantities of cheap water,282 and price supports
have ensured profitable return on crops.2 8 3 Thus, the cost of

conservation measures often exceeds the inefficiency loss felt by
irrigators. Furthermore, as the ownership of conserved water is
unclear, senior water users fear junior appropriators might claim
a right to any water they conserve.
Reallocation of inefficiently used water. Recently, a number of

pressures have been forcing current users to pay increased prices
for water. In response to the massive federal deficit, the federal

government has increasingly sought to reduce agricultural loan
programs and commodity price supports.2 8 4 Congress has also
amended the Reclamation Act to provide the Bureau with the authority to raise prices and eliminate subsidies of federally devel-

oped water.285 The Bureau itself proposed a new rate policy that
R. STAVINS & ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR
WATER 47 (1983)). This is enough to supply the needs of one million residential households a year.
279. For example, a recent California Assembly Office of Research study found
that 19% of the Sacramento and Sanjoaquin Valley water right holders were willing to
sell their water rights. 1982 AOR REPORT, supra note 84, at 42. The Office of Research
also found that, as a result, at least 172,173 af of water would be freed for transfer. Id.
280. "[Flederal subsidies - hence low prices for water - blunt western farmers'
incentive to conserve water and encourage cultivation of water-intensive crops, such as
cotton or rice, in arid regions." Closing Brief of the Natural Resources Defense Council

at 16, Phase I of the Bay-Delta Estuay Hearings Before the State Water Resources Control Board
(1988) [hereinafter NRDC Brief] (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EFFICIENT INVESTMENTS IN WATER RESOURCES: ISSUES AND OPIONS, xiv (1983)).
281. The subsidies are transferred through Bureau low-interest and no-interest
contracts for water, "ability to pay contracts," and application of power generation proceeds to the cost of facility construction and maintenance. A full discussion of water
subsidies is beyond the scope of this article. See Roos-Collins, supra note 232, at 812-18
for a discussion of the subject.
282. For example, the average Central Valley Project price for water is $6.15/af,
while the actual average cost is $72.99/af. E.P. LEVEEN & L. B. KING, TURNING OFF TE
TAP ON FEDERAL WATER SUBSIDIES, I THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT: TlE $3.5 BILLION
GIVEAWAY 122 (1985) [hereinafter TURNING OFF THE TAP] (prepared for the Natural Resources Defense Council and the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation).
283. In 1983 alone, the cost of agricultural loan programs and commodity price
supports cost the federal government $28.3 billion. Id. at 10 n.2 (citing letter of David
Stockman, Director, Office of Management and Budget, to Congressman George Miller,
(June 21, 1984)).
284. Id. at 9-10.
285. Id. at 124-25, 147.
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ends discount pricing and requires the price of water to cover
operating and maintenance costs. 2'8 6 Moreover, the EPA has increased its pressure on the Bureau to charge "full cost" for federally supplied water.287 According to the EPA, the full cost
should include the cost of environmental harm. 88 As the price
of water rises, farmers will alter their demand for water2 89 and
create opportunities for instream reallocation. 90
Agricultural users and other appropriators are coming under
additional pressure to use water more efficiently. As noted earlier, the Bureau is shifting its mandate from project construction
and water development to resource management and conservation.291 The EPA is pressuring the Bureau to evaluate the potential for conservation more comprehensively. 9 The California
286. Id. at 133. As a partial result of this new approach, the Bureau's projected
1995 price for the sale of unallocated water is 25-40% higher than 1985 rates. Id. at
141. As a result of higher prices, for the first time in many years the Central Valley
Project revenue in 1987 was greater than expenses. 2 WATER MARKET UPDATE, supra note
186, No. 2, at 10 (1988).
287. In response to a Bureau Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) on the
proposed sale of 1.5 million af/yr of unallocated California water, the EPA stated that
the DEIS was inadequate, inter alia, because it failed to:
a. Estimate the actual cost of Federal water proposed for marketing, including monetized estimates of negative externalities (e.g. destruction of selfsustaining anadromous fisheries), and estimate the full costs of water treatment
required to offset adverse drainage impacts.
b. Analyze whether Federal subsidies for water and crops affect water demand.
c. Explain whether demand would be influenced by alternative pricing
schemes....
d. Examine whether a gradual shift away from water-intensive crops toward
water efficient crops could result in substantial savings of CVP water. Discuss
whether such a gradual shift could be promoted by water conservation contract
conditions or tiered pricing.
Attachment to McGovern Letter, supra note 5, at 3.
288. This "actual cost" would include not only the building and operating of
projects, but also harm to water quality, wetlands, and fisheries. /, at 2.
289. G. WEATHERFORD, supra note 242, at 26.
[A] study by... the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that a price
increase in the Westlands Irrigation District (San Luis Unit) from $15.80/acrefoot to $25.00/acre-foot, could significantly (34%b) decrease water use by a shift
in cropping patterns and increased water use efficiencies (Moore, el.al, "Structure and Performance of Western Irrigated Agriculture," Giannini Foundation
Bulletin 1905, University of California, 1982).
Attachment to McGovern Letter, supra note 5, at 3.
290. For a discussion of the significant quantity of water which can be obtained
through improved irrigation techniques, see U.S. COMPrROLLER GEN., BErTrR FE.AL
COORDINATION NEEDED TO PROMOTE MORE EFFICIENT FARM IRRiGATION, 6-9 (1976).
291. See generally ASSESSMENT '87, supra note 162.
292. See, e.g., Attachment to McGovern Letter, supra note 5, at 3.

188

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 9:132

Legislature has recently enacted legislation requiring Agricultural Water Management Plans,2 9 3 and has allocated $150 million
in low-interest loans to local agencies for water conservation and
agricultural drainage projects.2 9 4 The result of increased water
costs and pressures to conserve will be a reduction in irrigation
and crop production on marginal lands, 295 and a freeing
up of
2 96
flows.
instream
to
reallocated
be
may
water which
Finally, under a system of market-based reallocation, instream
groups could use increased scrutiny of water use to force inefficient water users to reduce their waste. Market-based reallocation creates an incentive for an instream group to search out and
challenge inefficient and unreasonable water use because they
can use the threat of an unreasonableness challenge in negotiation over the purchase of inefficiently used water.
Once an inefficient use is discovered, the instream group can
take a number of approaches. It can offer to purchase the unreasonably used water. It can offer to install conservation or salvage
mechanisms to free the unreasonably used water and thereby
gain a right to the saved water.2 9 7 Or, if theright holder is not
amenable to selling his right, the instream group can consider
initiating an unreasonable use action with the SWRCB. 2 1' The
instream group can either threaten to take an action to the
293. Agricultural Water Management Planning Act, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1080010855 (West Supp. 1990).
294. Water Conservation and Water Quality Bond Law of 1986, CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 13450-13469 (West Supp. 1990).
295. See NRDC Brief, supra note 280, at 16 (citing Levy, Pricing Federal Irrigation
Water: A CaliforniaCase Study, 1982 FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO ECON. REV. 35
(Spring 1982)).
296. Incentives will exist for the agricultural user who is losing money because of
the loss of subsidies to sell her right to an instream group in order to receive compensation for a water right which is no longer efficient to use.
297. Such a transaction would be similar to the current proposed deal between the
Metropolitan Water District and the Imperial Irrigation District, where the MWD would
pay for the lining of the American Canal and receive in return an entitlement to most of
the saved water. See MWD-IID discussion supra note 186 and accompanying text.
298. Instream groups seeking market-based reallocation do not suffer from the
same drawbacks as junior appropriators because: (1) even though the problem of unclear seniority may still exist and the value of the water right sought by the instream
group may not be worth the cost of litigation, the option exists for the instream group to
challenge an unreasonable use to persuade a right holder to sell the right to the instream group; and (2) instream groups who come from outside the social community
and are not neighboring land owners will be able to avoid the pressure of small community social norms.
For a discussion of the tactical use of litigation in instream value protection see
Graff, supra note 52, at 138.
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SWRCB or can actually institute an action against a right holder
to threaten the loss of his right and then settle the case by buying
the water right.
Reallocation of reasonably used water. Often irrigators use less
water without a reduction in productivity,2 99 but they either do
not have sufficient capital to install equipment, 00 or the cost of
implementing conservation measures is greater than conservation savings,3 0 ' or they do not perceive a direct financial benefit.30 2 In such cases, it might be feasible and profitable for the
agricultural user to sell some portion of the water saved through
conservation, and to use those proceeds to implement the conservation measures.3 0 3
In many cases, diversionary water uses are reasonable, beneficial, and profitable, but they do not reflect the highest possible
299.

G. WEATHERFORD, supra note 242, at 28, 215.

300. TUNING THE SysTEMt, supra note 170;
[S]tudy after study has shown that, on average, the output of western agriculture, as measured in revenues, could be maintained, even enhanced, with less
water than is presently consumed by western agriculture. However, the poor
financial condition of most farmers leaves them and their organizations without
the capital to make investments in efficiency that would be cost-effective from
the perspective of society as a whole.
Id. at 5.
301. In some areas of the Westlands Water District, for example:
[t]he use of sprinklers could increase preirrigation and first seasonal irrigation
efficiencies from the present level of 70 percent to 83 percent. An inch of water
applied unnecessarily reduces the irrigation efficiency about five percent
points. Increasing the efficiency from 70 to 83 percent would result in a net
savings in applied water of more.., than 6,500 acre-feet on about 30,000
acres. This 2.6 inch reduction in water application would result in a net annual
savings of less than $5 per acre when the District's water charge is $22 per acre-foot.
This savings is not enough to offset the costs involved in changing to a sprinkler system.
NRDC Brief,supra note 280, at 21 (citing Central Valley Project Water Association) (emphasis in original).
302. G. WEATHERFORD, supra note 242, at 30.
303. For example, assume that the cost of water to a farmer is $16 per acre foot
and the cost of implementing a more efficient tailwater recovery system is $18 per af.
The farmer can sell the right to one acre foot for $20, implement the efficiency mechanisms, and generate a net profit of $2 per acre foot saved. Such an exchange is feasible
when the cost of installing farmer-controlled conservation mechanisms is sufficiently
low. This would be possible, for example, in the Imperial Irrigation District, where the
cost of expanding the use of tailwater recovery varies from only $8 to $25 per acre foot.
R. STAVINS, supra note 278, at 47.
In addition to receiving efficient conservation mechanisms and a profit, the irrigator
can rebut claims of unreasonableness by demonstrating that she has implemented efficient water use mechanisms. She can thus benefit from a presumption that the remaining water is used in a reasonable and efficient manner.
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economic return for water use. In such instances, an instream
group might be willing to pay a water right holder more for the
use of the water than the right holder is realizing in economic

return. 0 4 Increased instream flows might generate greater revenue for those whose profits are based on the health of a stream's
fishery resources. Studies show, for example, that the economic
benefits received from an increase in salmon population resulting

from increased stream flows may be greater than the profit realized by farmers in low-value crops such as alfalfa and cotton. 30 5
In these situations, it is more profitable for the farmer to take

certain crops out of production and sell the water right to anglers
and commercial fishermen.30 6
Forfeiture and unreasonablenessclaims. In the past, forfeiture and

unreasonable use claims also discouraged water conservation
and thus prevented reallocation. 0 7 To encourage conservation
and the use of reclaimed and polluted water, the Legislature
amended the California Water Code in 1978 to state explicitly
that water freed through the implementation of conservation
304. In California, studies have determined that the average value of water for fish
hatchery purposes in the Trinity River is $23/af, and in the Toulumne River the average
value of water for salmon spawning is $40/af. D. GIBBONS, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF
WATER 69 (1986) (all dollar figures quoted from this source are in 1980 dollars). These
values are significant when compared to values of $22/af, $26/af, $26/af, and $15-28/af
associated with the respective production of barley, alfalfa, potatoes, and safflower in the
West Side of the San Joaquin Valley in California. Id. at 38.
Marginal water values for instream uses in Colorado depend on the extent of depletion of the instream flows and range from $24/af to $33/af. Id. at 68. One study found
that including shoreline users, anglers, and white-water rafters would increase peak marginal values to $75/af. Id. at 68-69. Similar values were found in a Utah study. Id. at 69.
305. F. Bollman, A Simple Comparison of Values: Salmon and Low Value Irrigation Crops 11-12 (unpublished paper presented at the spring conference of the Association of California Water Agencies, Engineers-Managers Section, May 9, 1979) (copy on
file with the Stanford Environmental Law Society) [hereinafter Simple Comparison].
306. Id. In addition, the California Water Code encourages this type of transfer by
stating that a farmer who takes land out of production does not run a risk of forfeiture or
unreasonableness charges. CAL. WATER CODE § 1011 (West Supp. 1990). Conserving
water by leaving land fallow is also a legitimate method of conservation, and the water
thus freed can be legitimately sold. Id.
307. A claim of forfeiture of an appropriative right may arise when the right is not
used for five consecutive years. CAL. WATER CODE § 1241 (West Supp. 1990). Moreover, when the water is used in an unreasonable manner, a claim of unreasonable use
may arise under the California Constitution. CAL. CONST. art X, § 2. If a water right
holder frees water by implementing conservation or reclamation mechanisms, then, one
presumes, he must not have been using the water reasonably and thus has no perfected
appropriative right to the water he conserves or reclaims. In fact, if an appropriator
does conserve or reclaim water, he runs the risk of losing his right to such water through
an unreasonableness claim filed by a junior appropriator.
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mechanisms3 0 8 or through the use of reclaimed or polluted water
is not subject to unreasonable use or forfeiture claims. 30 9 In response to concerns that right holders would lose their right if
they attempted to transfer conserved water, the Legislature
amended the California Water Code in 1982 to provide that any
water freed through conservation mechanisms may be sold,
leased, exchanged, or transferred without detriment to other
water rights held by the seller or transferee. 310 In 1980, the Legislature also added a provision that sale, lease, exchange, or
transfer, in itself, shall not affect any determination
of forfeiture
1
or evidence of waste or unreasonable use." I
The Legislature thus has acted to create incentives for conserving water by statutorily declaring conserved water to be safe
from unreasonableness challenges. Yet, the Legislature has
failed to enact similar
measures to encourage conservation of
"salvaged water".3 12 A reduction in salvaged water is subject to
the same claims of unreasonableness to which conserved water
had been subject prior to the enactment of California Water
Code sections 1010 and 1011. To remedy this problem, the
SWRCB should clearly establish rights and priorities to salvaged
water.3 1 3 The most sensible rule would be one which vests the
rights and the priority in the salvager, as is done with conserved
water. Additionally, the Legislature should amend the Water
Code so that salvaging and transferring such water will not be
subject to unreasonable use claims.
308. CA1_ WATER CODE § 1011(a) (West Supp. 1990).
309. CAL. WATER CODE § 1010(a) (West Supp. 1990). In fact, the Legislature de-

dared that use of polluted or reclaimed water is a reasonable beneficial use. Id.
310. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1010(b), 1011(b) (West Supp. 1990). This legislation
demonstrates the Legislature's awareness of the need to reallocate water.
311. CA. WATER CODE § 1244 (West Supp. 1990). This change does not preclude
a valid unreasonable use claim. It simply requires the junior appropriator to prove unreasonable use rather than allow for a presumption of unreasonable use.
312. Salvaged water is defined as "water saved by the implementation ofconservation measures to reduce the amount of water 'lost' due to seepage, percolation, evapotranspiration, or evaporation." O'Brien, supra note 167, at 1173. Salvaged water is
different from conserved water in that salvaged water is excess water that is generated by
prevention of a loss, such as seepage, during conveyance, whereas conserved water is
excess water that is generated by a reduced need for application of water, such as savings resulting from the use of more efficient irrigation technologies.
313. At the present time, no specific rule exists for salvaged water. The general
rule is that an individual is entitled to salvaged water that he procures through his own
efforts, as long as he does not violate the rights of other users. Id. at 1174.

192

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL

2.

[Vol. 9:132

The financial capability of instream groups to purchase instream
flows.

In order to effect a reallocation of water to instream flows,
instream groups must have sufficient financial resources to
purchase the necessary water. When one considers the many interest groups which benefit from instream flows, 3 1 4 it becomes

apparent that significant untapped resources exist to fund the reallocation of water resources to instream flows. Groups willing
to purchase water and water rights include those seeking to
purchase instream flows for private benefit, and those seeking to
purchase instream flows for public benefit. 31 5
Private benefit from instream flow reallocation. When water re314. See F. Bollman, supra note 89, at 13-14, identifying an extensive list of instream resource users.
315. A potential problem with market-based reallocation is that it may be used as a
mechanism for speculation in water rights. Speculation occurs when a water right is
purchased, and rather than being used, is stored (in a reservoir, or in the stream) and
then resold at a later time for a profit. By making it possible to leave water instream,
market-based reallocation allows speculators to purchase selected water rights under the
guise of protecting instream flows, hold them on the presumption their value will increase, and then resell them at a time when they can make significant profit. Speculation
thus would not provide instream flows with the permanent protection that is needed.
Because of the implied diversion requirement and the beneficial use requirement, however, it is currently not possible to speculate on water rights in California.
Speculation is considered an evil in California because it impounds or wastes water
and thereby prevents its beneficial use, though in many other western states it is viewed
differently. The potential for speculation is certainly there: in 1988, Prudential-Bache
offered partnership options in a Water Rights Asset Management Company called
Aqueduct I. Ltd. Brochure from Prudential-Bache Securities, 1988 (copy on file with the
Stanford Environmental Law Society). This organization expressed an interest in buying
rights to water used for agriculture and storing it to sell at a profit to growing municipalities in the near future. However, the speculation problem does not occur under the
proposed system of market-based reallocation because the water is neither being stored,
nor wasted, but is actually reallocated and put to the beneficial use of protecting instream values.
A variety of legislative possibilities exist to prevent speculation while still providing
some flexibility for reallocation. For example, the law could require the instream right
holder to hold the right for a period of years before reselling it. Another measure could
allow the right holder to sell a percentage of the right each year, (e.g., 10% a year after
the fifth year) or allow a resale only if the profits go to the purchasing of another instream flow. Given that the major impetus for speculation is the possibility of profit, the
most feasible restriction would be to limit the amount of profit allowed on the transfer of
instream water rights to any other use. Such a limitation would enable the right to be
transferred at fair market value but would require that the profit, after adjustment for
inflation, would not go to the "instream group." Instead, the profit would be transferred to the Environmental Water Fund or some similar conservation fund. Such a
regulation removes the incentive for investment interests to pose as instream groups
and purchase instream rights for the sole purpose of speculation.
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mains instream, private parties benefit-parties who may be willing to pay for that benefit. The most obvious beneficiaries of

increased flows include commercial fishermen, whose catch is dependent on adequate flow levels. Keeping water instream allows

adult salmon to swim upstream to spawn, and young salmon to
swim downstream to reach the sea and later become available for
capture. Commercial fishermen annually may lose millions of
dollars due to decreased instream flows.3 1 6 Studies done by the

California Department of Fish and Game suggest that as a result
of declining salmon and steelhead populations since 1968, California has lost more than $500 million in business revenue, and
over $1 billion in net profits.3 1 7
Fish and game organizations having an interest in the protection of fish and waterfowl3 18 populations are also a potentially
significant source of funds for the purchase of instream flows.
The current decrease in instream flows has caused significant
market economic and non-market economic31 9 loss in the king
salmon 320 and striped bass3 21 sportfishing industries. 3 2-2 As the
316. "The annual market economic costs to commercial fisheries range from
$215,900... to $10,795,200." Closing Brief for The Bay Institute of San Francisco at
47, Phase I of the Bay-Delta Estuary Hearing Before the Califomia State Water Resourcts Control
Board (1988) [hereinafter Bay Institute Brief).
317. CAL. ADVISORY CoMMrirrEE ON SALMON AND STEutEAD TRotrr, RESTORING
HE BALANCE: 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 42-43 [hereinafter RESTORING THIE BALAN cE].
318. See generally, F. Bollman, supra note 89, at 20-32. Waterfowl hunters are an
important potential instream group. " 'Duck Clubs' control more than 40 percent of the
good waterfowl habitat in the State... ."Il at 20. California waterfowl hunters should
be willing to purchase instream flows: They spent over $30 million on their sport in
1975. Id. at 27. A study conducted by Hammack and Brown estimated the average consumer surplus associated with waterfowl hunting to be approximately $54 a day. D.
GIBBONS, supra note 306, at 70 (citingJ. HANMACK & G.M. BROWN, JR., WATERFOWL AND
WErAnsDS: ToWARDS BIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS 29 (1974).
319. Non-market economic values consist of: option value, or the value associated
with preserving the option to enjoy the resource at a later time; bequest value, or the
value derived from preserving the resource for one's heirs, and existence value, the
value associated with simply knowing that the resource will continue to exist. Colby,
supra note 223, at 89.
320. The annual non-market economic impacts on the existence value of king
salmon range from $73 million to $2.3 billion; the annual non-markct economic impacts
on the bequest value of king salmon range from $32.8 million to over $1 billion. Bay
Institute Brief, supra note 316, at 47. "[Plositive economic impacts for corresponding
increases in king salmon stocks range from $215,900 to $10,494,300." Id.
321. "Striped bass is one of the most important species sought on commercial passenger fishing boats." Id. at 51. "Anglers' lack of success has caused the charter boat
industry to drop-off [sic] sharply." Id "The decline of the striped bass population has
had and will have a serious deleterious effect on businesses servicing sport fishermen.
Each striped bass caught generates an estimated value of approximately twenty dol-
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economic benefits correlated with an increase in instream flows
are generally proportional to the current projected losses, market-based reallocation will allow commercial fishermen and
sportfishing associations the opportunity to increase their economic and non-economic gain by purchasing instream flows. It is
estimated that restoration of the salmon and steelhead populations alone could yield $150 million a year to California
3 23
business.

Recreational interests are another source of funding for the
purchase of instream values. Recreational interests include
whitewater rafting, kayaking, canoeing, waterskiing, swimming,
sailing, windsurfing, reservoir beach activity, and the aesthetic
pleasure associated with outdoor recreation near water.3 24 As
noted above, recreation interests have already taken action in Nevada to purchase 3,000 af to maintain a stable reservoir shoreline
for recreational boating and fishing.3 25 Moreover, studies indicate that the demand for water-based recreation may never be
totally satisfied. 26
Irrigators and municipalities are two more groups who have
an interest in purchasing instream flows. Throughout the BayDelta hearings, both the Delta farmers and the southern municipalities advocated higher water quality standards in the Delta.3 27
If less water is taken out of the Delta outflow, the water quality
will increase.3 21 Market-based reallocation will allow both of
these groups to purchase water rights from other appropriators,
lars .... Non-market values associated with the sportfishing of striped bass are estimated
to be at least ten times the market values." Id. (citations omitted).
322. Annual market economic costs to sport fishing service industries that rely on
king salmon could range from $28,000 to $1.4 million. Non-market economic costs related to sport fishing could range from $4.7 million to $149 million per year. Id. at 47.
323. RESTORING THE BALANCE, supra note 317, at 42.
324. Erman, Clark & Perrine, supra note 157, at 100.
325. See supra note 199. For a discussion of the many interests benefitting from
recreational use, see Erman, Clark & Perrine, supra note 157, at 101-02.
326. Erman, Clark & Perrine, supra note 157, at 102.
327. The Delta farmers want higher quality standards because of the problems of
salinity levels and toxics in the Delta. Closing Brief for the North Delta Irrigation District at 26, PhaseI of the Bay-Delta Estuary Hearings Before the California State Water Resources
Control Board (1988). Municipalities want higher water quality standards because of the
high quality needed for consumptive uses and the high cost of water treatment. Brief for
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, State Water Contractors at 3233, Phase I of the Bay-Delta Estuary HearingsBefore the California State Water Resources Control
Board (1988).
328. Increased streamflow levels increase water quality through increased dissolved oxygen levels and other water quality variables, and thus create "economic bene-
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or maybe from one another, for the express purpose of leaving
them instream
and thereby increasing the quality of the Delta
29
3

water.

Public benefit from instreamflow reallocation. Public interest environmental organizations such as the Nature Conservancy have
shown an active interest in the protection of instream values.
The efforts of these groups demonstrate that there is a constituency with dedication, resources, and desire to improve instream
values. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of public interest
environmental organizations' willingness to invest is the millions
of dollars they have spent on litigation and persuasion in attempts to influence public policy.33 0
In Colorado, the Nature Conservancy has already spent
$15,000 for the purchase of an instream flow for Boulder
Creek."' In California, the Water Heritage Trust seeks to use
fits related to the costs of treatment that would otherwise be incurred by dischargers and
by downstream water users." Colby, supra note 223, at 89-90. Moreover.
The quality of irrigation water can affect crop yields; for example, high salinity
levels may preclude production of many crops other than salt-tolerant ones.
The water quality effects of irrigated agriculture are numerous. Surface runoff
from fields can contain pesticides, phosphates from fertilizers, dissolved salts.
and suspended solids from eroding land. These constituents can be detrimental to irrigation as well as to other downstream water users.
D. GiBBONS, supra note 307, at 25.
A recent study calculated the damage to crops irrigated with high salinity Colorado
River water to be almost $6 million. Id at 63 (citing R. YOUNG & S.L GRAY. EcoNo.stic
VALUE OF WATER: CONCEPTS AND EMPIRICAL EsTMATEs 203 (1972) (Technical Report to
the-National Water Commission)). This number did not include damages to fish and
wildlife populations caused by the high salinity water. /id
329. It is generally understood that municipalities will be able to outbid most other
potential water purchasers. In such situations, instream flow groups may be able to
negotiate physical solutions wherein they would assist in paying for the purchase of
water in order to dictate delivery terms which maximize benefit instream values.
330. Huffinan, Instream Water Use: Public & Private Alternatives, in WATER Riotrrs:
SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND riE ENVIRONMENT 249, 275-76 (T.

Anderson ed. 1983); see also

FINAL REPORT

stating-

Public and private groups have tried to use traditional procedures in non-traditional ways, to expand existing legal doctrines, and to use entirely new approaches not part of current law for instream protection. The fact that these
time-consuming, costly and often unsuccessful efforts continue is indicative of
the need for a more effective system.
FINAL REPORT, supra note

2, at 108.
331. Harrison, Water Rights: A Protection Toolfor the lest, 37

NATURE CONSERVANCY

Ecology Forum No. 64, at 27 (1987). The Nature Conservancy has
purchased an 1882 water right to one cubic foot per second for Boulder Creek which
flows through Boulder, Colorado. The cost was $15,000. The Conservancy has plans to
resell the -water right to the Colorado Water Conservation Board for management. In
addition, "[t]he project members hope to acquire rights on unappropriated sections of
MAGAZINE,
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water marketing as a means to enhance rivers, streams, and wetlands." 2 Such private groups also have been effective at soliciting tax deductible donations of water resources.
The State of California is yet another possible source of funds
for public benefit instream flow reallocation. The California Department of Fish and Game already has limited authority to
purchase instream flow rights. This option has been exercised
sparingly. However, in January 1990, The Environmental Water
Act was passed. 3 It created an Environmental Water Fund and
a Water Quality Program in California. The DWR is required to
spend money from this fund "for water resource projects or
' 33 4
loans that will contribute significant environmental benefits."
Water marketing programs are among the eligible projects. This
law also provides for loans to public and private agencies for
wildlife and environmental protection.3 3 5
Although the Environmental Water Act does not specifically
appropriate funds for purchase of instream flows, its adoption is
evidence that the California Legislature is placing more emphasis
on the protection of wildlife and the environment through the
use of conservation and reallocation mechanisms, and also that
the Legislature considers a water marketing program to be a feasible means of obtaining its goals.
V.

CONCLUSION

In 1978, the Governor's Commission recognized the shortcomings of California's program for protecting instream values.
The Commission recommended that minimum streamflows be
established to create a permanent level of protection for instream
values, and that state agencies be given a broader mandate to
purchase instream flows. In the ten years since the Commission
made its recommendations, the Legislature has acted on only a
mountain headwaters and to negotiate for pivotal rights on fully appropriated streams."
Hoose, Leaving Water in Western Streams, 30 NATURE CONSERVANCY NEWSLETTER, Ecology
Forum No. 30, at 26 (1979) (copies on file with the Stanford Environmental Law
Society).
332. 2 WATER MARKET UPDATE, supra note 186, at No. 9 at 12 (September 1988).
333. CAL. WATER CODE § 12929 (West Supp. 1990).
334. The primary focus of the bill is to expend money "to preserve the wildlife and
environment of the Mono Lake Basin," CAL. WATER CODE § 12929.20 (West Supp.
1990), and for restoration and enhancement of fisheries habitat, wetlands, and riparian
habitat. CAL. WATER CODE § 12929.26 (West Supp. 1990).
335. CAL. WATER CODE § 12 9 29.41(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
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few. Instream flow advocates have thus looked to the courts and
the expansion of legal doctrines (such as reasonableness and the
public trust doctrine) to provide some mechanisms for protecting
instream values. Unfortunately, there are significant limitations
on the use of these doctrines to reallocate water from existing
diversions to protect instream values.
Although legislative attempts to solve the instream flow crisis
are at an impasse, the Legislature has devoted considerable attention to resolving the State's water needs by encouraging conservation and water marketing. Federal and state water
management institutions are seeking to facilitate water marketing
as a means of meeting the state's growing and changing demand
for water. Recently enacted policies, intended to facilitate water
marketing generally, can also be used to effect transactions to
transfer water from existing diversions to instream flows. Such
transactions have several distinct advantages over the judicial
and administrative reallocations sought by many environmental
groups. The authors encourage these groups to ride the current
wave of market-based reallocation and actively lobby legislative
and administrative policy-makers to make water marketing the
next step in protecting California's instream values.

